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The cellular communication industry in Hong Kong has been rapidly expanding 
since the 1980's. Its development has undergone great turmoil and sharp changes. 
As a historical investigative report, this study investigates the distinctive changes that 
have taken place in the cellular communication market between the mid-1980's and 
the mid-1990's as well as the forces leading to those changes. Guided by a political 
economy framework and an economic liberalism perspective, the changes in the 
market are generated by political, economic as well as technological factors. 
Political factors include the changing regulatory environment and the changing 
political condition. Economic factors include the forces of capital ownership and 
corporate strategy. Technological factor refers to the advancement of technology. 
There are also some extraneous factors affecting the market at a particular situation 
and a particular period of time. On the one hand, the forces are interdependent upon 
one another. On the other hand, they are competing against one another. 
The cellular communication market can be regarded as an initiator of 
deregulation and liberalization within the telecommunications industry. It is one of 
the first telecommunications sectors that is open for competition and expansion. The 
most apparent force leading to the rise of cellular communication is the introduction 
of cellular communication technology from overseas countries, a changing regulatory 
regime and successful overseas experiences in telecommunications liberalization. 
Starting from the early 1990's, the cellular communication market has been run by an 
oligopoly: From that time onwards, competition among the operators are 
intensified and the market expands in an unprecedented rate. All of the forces 
(except the political condition) are simultaneously competing and striving for power 
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to accelerate the competitiveness of the liberalized market. Entering the mid-1990's, 
the philosophy of a free market place in cellular communication is put forward. 
Political, economic and technological forces are all at work in affecting the 
development of the industry. Most significantly, the situation is greatly influenced 
by the unstable political condition characterized by the 1997 issue. At the same 
time, the 1997 question of Hong Kong's sovereignty transfer to China adds 
complexity to the development of the cellular communication market. It is the 
interplay of economic, political and technological forces which creates a dynamic 
market in Hong Kong's cellular communication industry. 
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'One-in-five people in Hong Kong carried a pager, and one in 15 had a cellular 
phone, according to telecommunications experts' ‘ in mid-1995. After two years’ time, 
the penetration rate of cellular phones is almost the same as that of pagers in which one 
in 6 people adopts the cellular technology. Among the four dragons, ‘Hong Kong vies 
with Singapore for leadership in telecommunications services. Against Singapore's 
teledensity of 44 telephone mainlines per 100 inhabitants, Hong Kong boasts 3 million 
mainlines connected, or one for every two persons. The switched network is entirely 
digital and the mesh connecting telephone exchanges is all optical fibre, as are many of 
the cables servicing Hong Kong's central business district.'^ ]n July 1990，a fibre-
optic cable was laid between Hong Kong and Taiwan, and also from Hong Kong to 
Japan and Korea, started the operation and effectively increased the capacity for 
communication with those countries 12 times. Through the links with Japan and with 
other cables stretching across the Pacific to the United States, Hong Kong had plugged 
itself into the world fibre-optic grid^. ki the same year, the launch of the AsiaSat-1 
marked Hong Kong's first serious entry into satellite communication. In addition, 
'because there are no local timed call charges, the use of facsimile is also encouraged, 
and there are now a quarter ofamillion separate fax lines.，* All these prove the Hong 
Kong Government's encouraging position towards the telecommunications industry. 
‘Eastem Express, 3 July 1995. 
2 Ure, John. 'Telecommunications in China and the Four Dragons.，Telecommunications in Asia: 
Policy, Planning and Development. Hong Kong: HongKongUniversity Press, 1995. p.22. 
3 Hong Kong Standard, 2 April 1990. 
4 Ure, John, 'Telecommunications in China and the Four Dragons., Telecommunications in Asia: 
Policy, Planning and Development. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1995. p.22. 
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The telecommunications industry has come to occupy a significant place in 
Hong Kong's economy. 'In its own right the telecommunications sector is directly 
responsible for 2.5% of Hong Kong's Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Furthermore, 
this percentage is growing as Hong Kong becomes more reliant on its services sector 
for the maintenance ofHong Kong's standard ofliving and the future prosperity of the 
community. In recent years the telecommunications sector in Hong Kong has grown 
by about 10% in real terms which is roughly twice as fast as the economy as a whole.'^ 
Between the 1980's and the 1990's, the telecommunications system in Hong Kong is 
characterized by the high penetration of radio-paging services, the rapid growth of 
facsimile and, most significantly, the provision of cellular communication services. 
The telecommunications development in Hong Kong has undergone great turmoil and 
sharp changes since the mid-1980's and continues to thrive in the 1990's. 
‘Telecommunications itself covers a vast area. Broadly speaking, any 
equipment that assists in producing, transmitting, storing, receiving or displaying 
information can be classified as telecommunications technology.'^ Telephony can be 
regarded as one of the most popular telecommunication technology in Hong Kong. 
‘Hong Kong started to adopt the telephony technology a hundred years ago, being one 
ofthe most advanced Asian places in possessing such technology." As the Hong Kong 
society has become more mobile in the sense that there is the diversification ofhome 
and work sites, the need to stay connected also becomes much stronger than in the past. 
Cellular phone, as a kind ofmobile communication tool, takes a crucial role for leisure, 
social contact, business and other non-business purposes in the society. 
5 Economic Services Branch, Government Secretariat, Hong Kong Government. Telecommunications 
Review: A Public Consultation Paper. 1 March 1997’ p. l . 
6 Hong Kong Standard, 24 April 1988. 
' M i n g Pao, lOMay 1989. 
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Nowadays, cellular phones are in the cinemas, on the ferries, at the 
supermarket and at every haughty business luncheon in town. However, at first, they 
were for the privileged few and were perceived as status symbols. Nowadays, they are 
being pursued as practical means of communication. It is certain that sooner or later 
most people in town will be able to afford a cellular phone, hi fact, cellular service is 
the first sector that undergoes liberalization in the telecommunications industry. In 
this study, I would like to investigate the distinctive changes that have taken place in 
the cellular communication industry from the mid-1980's up till the present. More 
importantly, I am going to examine the factors leading to those changes. 
Research Objectives 
My main task is to examine and understand the framework within which the 
cellular communication industry in Hong Kong has been structured, and how that 
framework changed between the late 1980's and the mid-1990's. 
In the first place, it is important to identify the situations before and after 
changes took place. The cellular phone market constituted a stagnant business before 
1992. Starting from 1992, accompanied by the digital era, corporate competition 
intensified and created a dynamic expansion of markets. It is definite that different 
factors are involved in the changes. 
Regulators had done theirjob in promoting the direction of development for 
the industry. The liberalization of the cellular phone industry was in fact an initiator of 
liberalization in the local and international telephone market. It indirectly led to the 
establishment ofa second network in Hong Kong which brought about the opening up 
ofa different telecommunications sector in Hong Kong. Hence, examining the role of 
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regulators in terms ofpolicy objectives, functions and services, etc. is vital, t i the case 
of cellular communication, the role of regulator can be studied through the details of 
granting the digital network as well as the PCS O^ersonal Communications Services) 
licenses. Presumably there should be some political and economic factors considered 
by the regulator in doing the job. hi addition, the Government had progressively 
liberated the use of state-owned radio frequencies and spectxums to facilitate the 
adoption of certain technologies. The meaning of such moves should also be 
examined. 
As Hong Kong is experiencing a political transition, British influence and 
Chinese influence are mingling together and affecting the society. The Chinese side, 
which follows the ideas of the Communist party, has the intention to control the 
telecommunications market. However, the Chinese government also regards the 
importance of obtaining profits. For the British side, the government aims at 
deregulating the market as well as maintaining the shares of profits when British 
sovereignty ends in Hong Kong after 1997. It is apparent that the targets ofthe Chinese 
and the British governments are somehow different from each other. Thus, another 
task is to understand how the different beliefs of the Chinese government and the 
British government affect the changes in the industry. 
This study also examines the capital ownership of licensed operators arid their 
corporate strategies between the 1980，s and the 1990's. In the cellular communication 
industry，different consortiums with different corporate strategies are involved in 
supporting the market. Different periods have different kinds of consortiums backed 
up by different local and overseas financial sources. Economic benefits are, of course, 
the key issue to attract investments. Attracting local and foreign investments may be 
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one ofthe drives in liberalizing the market. In order to attract more market shares and 
profit margins, the operators have to adjust the corporate strategies to cope with the 
environment. 
The history and evolution of the cellular phone industry can be 
categorized as follows: 
1. The analogue cellular phone (the first generation) 
2. Digitalization of networks 一 ‘The formatting of information into 
binary code, ‘1，or ‘0’ for discrete discontinuous communication, 
as opposed to analogue formatting which transmits as a 
continuous waveform.'^ It offers better voice quality and allows 
more economical use of spectrum. 
3. PCS (Personal Communication Services) 一 It operates at a 
higher frequency and allows the use of ultra-light cordless phones. 
Handsets are operated on less battery power and cheap to produce. 
It also facilitates the design of flexible service packages. 
Technology plays a very important role in accelerating market liberalization 
and competition. It is technology which opens the range of products and services as 
well as opens more rooms for interested parties. The change of the analogue phone 
system to the digital phone system enabled a rapid expansion of the cellular phone 
market. The PCS technology puts Hong Kong into a new personal communications 
era in which the future is hard to predict. As the last task, the question of the 
relationship among the regulator, the market players and new technology is something 
worthy for discussion. 
* Ure, John. 'Telecommunications in China and the Four Dragons.’ Telecommunications in Asia: 
Policy, Planning and Development. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1995. p.252. 
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Related Studies 
There are studies related to Hong Kong's telecommunications industry, but not 
particularly focusing on cellular communication. Lee (1993) talks about the role of 
deregulation in maintaining Hong Kong as a communications hub in Asia-Pacific 
region. He addresses freedom of information is an important element to strengthen 
Hong Kong as a communications hub when confronting the Chinese rule in 1997. Fair 
and genuine competition is also crucial to a liberalized market. His study throws light 
on my understanding ofHong Kong's position in telecommunications among the four 
dragons. 
In addition, Lee (1994) discusses China's role in Hong Kong's 
telecommunications deregulation through a political and economic assessment. His 
political economy perspective is a relevant direction for my study in cellular 
communication. He addresses the importance of identifying capital interests in 
deregulation, which helps to analyze the complexity in the deregulation process. He 
concludes that when sovereignty changes, all the players must adapt to the rules laid 
down by their new master. Economic considerations are juxtaposed with politics. A 
state's telecommunications policy is seldom purely economic. Lee points out the 
economic planning of the state can also be a political move. In other words, power and 
politics are involved in the deregulation process. In my analysis, I will incorporate the 
notions of power and politics into the economics of the cellular communication 
market. 
Ure (1989) reviews the telecommunications system in Hong Kong. He 
describes the forces of change and analyses whether deregulation and increased 
competition would be of positive benefits to consumers. Lam (1996) describes the 
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evolution of the local telephone industry in Hong Kong and focuses on analyzing the 
phases of regulation, the roles of regulators, and so on. The two writers show the 
possible existing forces covering politics and economics which shape the industry. 
Mueller (1991) has done an analysis in the case of liberalization in the 
telecommunications industry of Hong Kong. He argues that it is time for the 
Government to review its policy on international telecommunications so as to permit 
competition after 1992. His report states baldly that ‘Hong Kong users are being 
overcharged for international telecommunications by $1.5 billion to $2 billion 
annually. While the international telecommunications service monopoly franchise 
holder, Hong Kong Telecommunications International (HKTI), makes an annual net 
profit margin of 60 per cent to 70 per cent.'^ He makes a major policy 
recommendation that Hong Kong should not wait until 2006 to permit open 
competition in international telecommunications as the international service 
significantly subsidizes the local telephone network, and has also hampered the 
Government's attempts to introduce competition in the domestic communications 
market. Moreover, the Government possesses both the legal authority to make the 
necessary changes and a strong public interest justification for starting liberalization. 
Mueller's study is a very important benchmark in urging the regulator to introduce 
competition in the domestic and international telephone markets. He analyses the case 
from an economic perspective. He has also touched on some political facts. On the 
whole, his study mainly focuses on the FTNS (Fixed Telecommunications Network 
Services) and he never addresses the cellular services. 
9 South China Moming Post, 26 January 1991. 
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Mueller (1994) is also interested in writing the relationship between Hong 
Kong and China towards telecommunications. His work discusses the significance of 
the 1997 sovereignty transfer for the development of telecommunications in the greater 
China region. He argues that the verbally simple ‘one country, two systems' formula 
papers over the complexities of what will actually be a long-term process of 
convergence or integration between the telecommunications regimes of Hong Kong 
and China. He identifies the political and economic interests for the development. 
Another scholar, Lovelock (1996)，also writes about the relationship between Hong 
Kong and China. He presents a bargaining framework between Hong Kong and China 
which provides greater flexibility in telecommunications policy-making for Hong 
Kong administrators in the lead-up and passage through 1997. The two scholars 
highlight the relationship between Hong Kong and China that will affect the 
telecommunications development. As an investigative study, I would also take the 
task to analyze the role of China towards Hong Kong's cellular communication in the 
concluding part. 
Most of the researchers take Hong Kong's telecommunications industry as a 
whole for examination. Lee and Ure analyze the roles of deregulation and the role of 
China by looking at different forces at play. Lam mainly focuses on the local 
telephone industry. Mueller does a rather predictive project, urging the government to 
review telecommunications policy and bringing out the pros and cons about 
deregulation. All of them highlight the possible directions for my analysis in the 
cellular communication industry in which a political economy perspective is feasible 
for my research. None of the researchers talks about the changes in the cellular 
communication industry in detail. They prefer looking at the overall 
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telecommunications environment or the fixed networks as a whole and adopt a rather 
broad perspective in the analyses. Besides, almost all of the studies about 
telecommunications in Hong Kong were conducted between 1991 and 1994. t i fact, 
during that period, liberalization had already been taking place in the cellular 
communication market and changes were evolving up till the present. Thus, the 
analysis ofthe cellular communication industry may help to supplement more details 
to the past studies and contribute to a broader body ofknowledge in the field. 
A Political Economy Framework 
'The fact that a particular activity is characterized by nonpolitical behavior ~ 
for instance, transactions carried on through a competitive price system - does not 
imply that political power is unimportant. The effect of politics may be indirect; it 
may determine the relationships within which day-to-day economic processes take 
place. Critics of pluralistic approaches to local and national politics have pointed out 
that this second "face of power" is extremely important in determining which issues 
are raised for political action. ‘ ^  ° 
The activity in the cellular communication market can be regarded as 
nonpolitical business behavior. However, as I have pointed out earlier, there are 
different factors evolving and affecting the market activities. The factors are 
interdependent upon one another. 'Interdependence means mutual dependence.''^ ‘As 
the mutual links intensify, power sharing becomes necessary，with the pressure of 
1 � S e e P ter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, 'Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework,' 
American Political Science Review 57 (1963): 632^2 . Reprinted in Roderick Bell, David 
Edward, and Harrison Wagner (eds.), Political Power Q^ew York: Free Press, 1969). Also see 
Keohane, R.0. & Nye, J.S.. Power and Interdependence. Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman 
and Company, 1989. p.39. 
“Keohane, R.0. & Nye，J.S.. Power and Interdependence. Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman and 
Company, 1989. p.39. 
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interdependence as the motive power ofintegration.'^^ However, one should note that 
the power sharing does not always mean ‘equal’ sharing of power, ][n that sense, one 
factor may be a more powerful one than the other in a particular period. As a 
preliminary classification, the factors include the changing regulatory environment, 
political condition, capital ownership, corporate strategy and technological evolution. 
Generally speaking, the primary factors can be divided up into political, economic and 
technological concerns. The argument of this study is that the relationship between 
economics and politics is a reciprocal one in the cellular communication sector of 
Hong Kong. It can be best understood by adopting a political economy framework for 
analysis. ‘On the one hand, politics largely determines the framework of economic 
activity and channels it in directions intended to serve the interests of dominant groups, 
the exercise of power in all its forms is a major determinant of the nature of an 
economic system. On the other hand, the economic process itself tends to redistribute 
power and wealth; it transforms the power relationships among groups. This in tum 
leads to a transformation ofthe political system, thereby giving rise to a new structure 
of economic relationships.'^^ 
An Economic Liberalism Perspective 
In Hong Kong, the Government takes the positive non-intervention approach 
and laizze-faire as the guiding principle to industrial policy. It conforms to one ofthe 
conceptions of political economy -- liberalism. Following Adam Smith, 'liberalism 
assumes that there is a basic harmony between true national interest and cosmopolitan 
'"Pinder, John. ‘Interdependence, Democracy and Federalism' in Parry Geraint (ed.), Politics in an 
Interdependent World:: Essays Presented to Ghita Ionescu. C^ermont: Edward Elgar, 1994) p.m. 
13 Gilpin, Robert. U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation: The Political Economy ofForeign 
Direct Investment. London: Macmillan, 1975. pp.21-22. 
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economic interest. For the liberalist, the goal of economic activity is the optimum or 
efficient use of the world's scarce resources and the maximization of world welfare.'^^ 
In Hong Kong's cellular communication market, the spectrum being allocated to the 
operators is a scare resource. Cellular operators have to make full use of the limited 
spectrum to maximize their operations according to their own plans and strategies. 
In particular, the activities in the cellular communication market correspond to 
what economic liberalism advocates. Economic liberalism stresses that ‘the primary 
motivating force is the competitive interaction between individuals, who are assumed 
to maximize their satisfaction, or utility, especially through the social institution of the 
market. The market aggregates these individual preferences and utilities (on the 
demand side) and (on the supply side) the actions of profit-seeking firms."5 Economic 
liberalism also focuses on ‘competition between firms'. ‘Economic outcomes will be 
affected by market structure. Liberal economists accept that there may be a case for 
some state intervention to correct market imperfections.'^^ In addition, liberal 
’ economic theory claims to be advancing propositions which are in the interests of 
consumers. To sum up, ‘a key concept in liberal economics is efficiency, both in its 
allocative and productive senses.’!？ The Hong Kong's cellular communication market 
allows competition among the operators. When there is imperfect competition, OFTA 
(Office of the Telecommunications Authority) will intervene in order to protect 
14 Gilpin, Robert. U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation: The Political Economy ofForeign 
Direct Investment. London: Macmillan, 1975. pp26-27. 
i'Gill，S. & Law, D. The Global Political Economy: Perspectives, Problems and Policies. New York: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1988. p p . 4 M 3 . 
16 Gill，S. & Law，D. The Global Political Economy: Perspectives, Problems and Policies. New York: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1988. p p . 4 M 3 . 




consumer interests. The regulator takes the perspective of consumers but not that of 
market players. 
It is obvious that economic liberalism is a supporter of democracy. If, 
according to the liberal economists, the cellular communication market in Hong Kong 
can be treated as an open market. But the fact is that access to the cellular 
communication market is not always open to all. Some firms can enter the market but 
some are being screened out in the licensing processes. At the same time, market 
players are not having the same level of power in the competitive environment. 
The Factors Affecting the Market 
To make things clear, my study seeks to figure out the distinctive changes that 
had taken place in the cellular communication market as well as the political, 
economic and technological factors affecting it. 
A dynamic cellular communication market of Hong Kong was created under 
deregulation, liberalization and competition. Different political, economic and 
technological forces are at work within the market. The construction ofthe framework 
is based on the concept of ‘ interdependence' ^  ^  involved in political economy. 
According to Dyson and Humphreys, there is a complex interdependence of market 
and politics. 'Neither a logic of the market nor a logic of the state has been in evidence. 
Communications policies have been contingent on the complex configurations of 
market forces, technological changes, institutional self-interests and realities of 
dependence within policy networks that are specific to individual cases.''^ Although 
18 Comor, Edward A. 'Introduction: The Global Political Economy ofCommunication and IPE' in 
Edward A. Comor (ed.), The Global Political Economy of Communication: Hegemony, 
Telecommunication and the Information Economy Q I^ew York: St. Martin's Press, 1994) p.5. 
19 Dyson, Kenneth and Humphreys, Peter. ‘Conclusion，in Kenneth Dyson and Peter Humphreys 
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Dyson and Humphreys mainly analyze the relationship among communication 
policies, market and politics, their analysis helps to show that different forces and 
elements are interweaving in a telecommunications market. There are interactions of 
groups and subgroups in the market, ]n the case of Hong Kong, the above structure 
presents the regulatory agencies, the special political transition, different consortiums, 
market strategies and even technological innovations are posing pressure on changing 
the cellular communication environment. The political economy approach pursues a 
complex interdependence perspective which assumes the structures and competition 
characterizing the global capitalist marketplace constitute the basic framework for 
analvsis. '2G ^ 
Political factors affecting the industry include the changing regulatory 
environment and the changing political condition. The regulatory processes are always 
being influenced by politics. The regulatory environment involves the regulator, or 
regulatory agencies, and policy-making in responds to political and society changes. 
There exists the relationship between the market and the regulator which is an 
important notion in political economy. In Hong Kong, the Government initiated 
deregulation and liberalization in the cellular communication sector in the mid-1980's. 
Deregulation and liberalization are considered as two of the factors contributing to the 
development of the cellular communication industry. In regard to the political 
condition, telecommunications, in a traditional sense, it is a matter for national security 
and sovereignty. As Mueller points out the political constraints on liberalization are 
complicated by the growing influence of China over Hong Kong's political economy. 
(eds.), The Political Economy of Communications: International and European Dimension. Q^ew 
York: Routledge, 1990) p. 241. 
2° Comor, Edward A. 'Introduction: The Global Political Economy ofCommunication and IPE' in 
Edward A. Comor (ed.), The Global Political Economy of Communication: Hegemony, 
Telecommunication and the Information Economy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994) p.5. 
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The traditional approach of positioning telecommunications as a security tool was 
present among Chinese officials. For the British officials, they had already changed 
their perspectives into regarding telecommunications as a strategic tool for profits and 
control，rather than a traditional tool for security. The different views, or sometimes 
conflicting views, between the two sides might have exerted certain pressure on the 
planning and approval procedures of the industry. 
Economic factors refer to capital ownership and corporate strategy of the 
cellular communication operators. One of the keys to political economy is the 
concentration of purchasing power in the hands of the largest companies.�� The 
stronger the capital ownership of operators, the more the power and the more the 
advantage of the operators in running their businesses, ki order to survive and 
maintain a firm market share in the market, the operators had to use different 
marketing strategies to promote their businesses. Corporate and marketing strategies 
helped them to modify their businesses and introduced new services when old products 
and services lost their attractiveness. Corporate strategies were merely backed up by 
the strong capital ofthe operators. Thus, capital ownership and corporate strategy are 
two essential elements of the economics. 
Technological evolution is another determining factor in affecting the industry. 
Without technological evolution, the political economy of the telecommunications 
sector will be insignificant. Technological evolution is largely shaped by political, 
economic and social interests. Raymond Williams argues that ‘equal access to media 
production would allow for a more democratic culture in which people have chances to 
discuss issues, formulate ideas, and creatively envision their lives.,22 Economic and 
21 Cowhey, Peter F. & Aronson, Johnathan D.. Managing the World Economy: The Consequences of 
Corporate Alliances. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993. p.l73. 
“Williams, Raymond. Television: Technology and Cultural Form. London: Wesleyan University 
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political goals are guidance for development of modem technology. Society changes 
give direction for technologists for conducting scientific research. The Hong Kong 
case demonstrate what Williams calls ‘mobile privatization' in modem way of life. 
Lives of Hong Kong people were becoming more mobile and they needed to be 
connected by transportation and communication systems. Lidividuals needed to be 
frequently connected when they were traveling to distant places or handling business 
tasks in different places. Cellular communication helped to achieve ‘mobile 
privatization'. Economic goals were achieved through huge investments and gaining 
of profits by running cellular communication businesses. Political goals could also be 
achieved through the adoption of such technology in accelerating - the passing of 
necessary information, or maintaining contact and control among the public. Hence, 
economic, political and social interests led to the development of cellular 
communication. It is crucial to examine how the technological evolution of cellular 
communication in Hong Kong corresponds to the different kinds of interests. 
Structure of the Study 
This study is presented as a historical investigative report about cellular 
communication in Hong Kong. Chapter 1 briefly describes the linkage between the 
traditional colonial telecommunications system in Hong Kong and the rise of cellular 
communication. It also addresses the contexts of deregulation, liberalization as well as 
competition within the Hong Kong cellular communication market. Chapter 2 
highlights the changes of the cellular communication market accompanied by 
digitalization technology and describes a broad picture of the market in terms of the 
Press, 1974. pp.xii-xiii. 
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cellular operators' activities in a competitive environment. Chapter 3 discusses the 
development of a free market place with the adoption of the new PCS technology 
characterized by political instability. As Hong Kong is facing the 1997 question, the 
effects of the linkage between Hong Kong and China on the cellular communication 
market will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
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Chapter 1 
From Monopoly Telephony 
to 
the Rise of Cellular Communication 
Colonial Monopoly Telephony since the 1900's 
When Hongkong people talk of telecommunications, they talk of Hongkong 
Telecom (Hongkong Telecommunications Ltd.). It is the major communications 
company in the territory. Li 1987, Hongkong Telecom was formed following the 
merger of two other firms (in 1984) who between them controlled the local 
telecommunications networks — HKTC (Hongkong Telephone Co. Ltd.) and C&W 
(Cable and Wireless (HK) Ltd.). 
When we trace back to the history of HKTC and C&W CHX), the two firms 
established a strong base in providing local and international communication services 
for the territory. ‘HKTC was incorporated in 1925 and granted a concession to 
provide all ofHong Kong's domestic telephone services, a right it has held ever since. 
In recent years, the company also provides a range of other services, including fax 
and data transmission, other privately-run competitive services, such as the cellular 
telephone system through its subsidiaries after the merger. Another company, 
C&W (HK), was granted a renewed license in 1981 to assume responsibility for 
Hong Kong's international telecommunications facilities and services since it landed 
the first submarine telegraph cable for the territory in 1871. The license granted to 
C&W (HK) in 1981 for a period of25 years give the company the exclusive right to 
establish, maintain and operate the international facilities and services in Hong 
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Kong’i until 2006. 
It is obvious that the major player in the telecommunications industry, 
Hongkong Telecom, has a strong British background and it represents the British 
interest in the industry. Hong Kong's telecommunications industry is said to be 
monopolized by a U.K.-based company. On the one hand, monopoly of the 
telecommunications sector was treated as a strategy tool for control of passing of 
information. On the other hand, it could be regarded as a tool for gaining profit for 
British interests. 
According to Melody, the rationale for regulating telecommunications common 
carriers is that the technology creates a condition of ‘natural monopoly'. ‘Natural 
monopoly exists when the technological alternatives are such that competition must 
inevitably lead to monopoly because larger-scale supply is believed to be more 
efficient than smaller scales of competitive supply. The monopoly is natural 
because it is determined by the state of the technological alternatives available at a 
particular point in time.'^ If Melody's view is right, we can say that the monopoly of 
telephony in Hong Kong is natural as large-scale business dominated by one-state-
approved company seems to be more promising than many small telephone networks. 
Technology development in the old days was immature, having the telephone system 
being analogue and simply mechanical in nature. If we perceive the issue from a 
political perspective, the ruling party may simply regard telecommunications as a 
security issue as well as a national asset, especially telephony. The Head of 
Telecommunications Review of the Hong Kong Government, Alexander A. Arena, 
‘South China Moming Post, 2 August 1988. 
2 Melody, William H.. ‘The Role of Advocacy in Public Planning Policy’ in George Gerber, Larry P. 
Gross & William H. Melody (eds.), Communications Technology and Social Policy O J^ew York: 
Wiley-Interscience, 1973)p.l69. 
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makes the following comment towards the monopoly issue: 
“It is the historical legacy accounts for the monopoly. Monopoly is not too 
unusual in many countries... I think the monopoly can not be simply regarded 
as natural. I can only say it is not unnatural and it is unfortunate that the 
license is issued to a single firm and you can't remake history.” ^ 
There is a more significant point: Hong Kong is under the British rule. 
Colonization allows the foreign ruling party to exert its influence to the greatest 
extent and maintain the interests of the colonial government. Mueller does not agree 
that monopoly is a natural entity. He even argues that it is so unnatural that there is 
a great deal of trouble to define the boundaries of why monopoly applies and why it 
does not apply. According to his view, monopoly is a legal construct. The 
monopoly was created to protect this British-based company from competition and it 
had no economic and technological basis. Hong Kong's telephony business had 
been under a long period of normal colonial exploitation^. The philosophy behind 
the regulatory regime of telecommunications in the early days was mainly to protect 
British interest as well as to control a strategic tool. It was a general belief that 
communication tools determined the stability of a society. The British colonial 
power had never regarded telephony as a business tool open for investment. 
Ironically, this perspective is in fact counteracting the basic principle of lazzie-faire 
policy ofthe Government. 
3 Interview with Alexander A. Arena, Head, Telecommunications Review, Economic Services Branch, 
Government Secretariat on 14 April, 1997. 
4 Interview with Milton Mueller, Visiting Scholar, Department of Information and Systems 
Management, School of Business and Management, The Hong Kong University of Science and 
Technology on 15 April, 1997. 
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The Rise of Cellular Communication 
Changes took place with digitalization and the application of micro-electronics. 
During the late 1970's to the early 1980's, digital technology started to thrive. The 
impact of digitalization on society was that it increased the capacity of telephone 
exchange which made the situation much easier for new entrants to start their 
businesses . It also opened up the network for provision of many value-added 
services, gave rise to the economy of scope and created market opportunities. 
In fact, during the 1970's, there was a lot of pressure from the vendors of CPE 
(Customer Premises Equipment) for value-added services. Many vendors would 
like to compete with Hongkong Telecom to get into the CPE market. The CPE 
market and cellular communication were excluded from the regulation of the 
Telephone Ordinance which was formulated in the 1920's. Thus, they were free of 
strict rules and price controls like the basic telephony business. 
In addition, a monopoly business does not need to consider cost structure. 
Instead, it only needs to consider the total cost and total profit as there is no 
competition. However, in the 1980's, with the development of more advanced 
technology, business communities became much more cost-conscious5. They were 
able to foresee the advantages of an open telecommunications market. At tJhat 
particular moment, the basic concept of "natural monopoly" was being questioned. 
Lobbying games developed in order to break up the monopoly tradition. At that 
period, the telecommunications sector was regarded an economic tool much more 
than a strategic tool for controlling of information. It was obvious that there was a 
shift of perspective among the Hong Kong and the British governments. The reason 
^ Interview with John Ure, Director o f the Telecommunications Research Project, Centre ofAsian 
Studies, University ofHong Kong on 14 April, 1997. 
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might be due to the diminishing power of the British to control the Hong Kong 
information society. The 1997 issue was under discussion between the British and 
the Chinese officials. The British might know that they had to give up their ruling 
power of Hong Kong in the coming future and it was better for them to make the 
telecommunications sector open to investments so as to gain more profits rather than 
controlling the environment. 
Overseas pressure also constituted a vital force in opening up the market. 
During 1980's, the major developed countries started liberalization in the 
telecommunications market including Britain，the United States and Japan. The 
governments of these places were more or less at the same time deciding that it was 
the right time for the privatization of the state-owned firms and the introduction of 
competition. These three major places carried out telecommunications reforms and 
set up a model for other places ofwhat was possible^. 
The Hong Kong Government believed in lazzie-faire and positive non-
intervention, The idea of liberalizing the telecommunications market was appealing. 
As a colony of Britain and driven by the successful experience of liberalization in 
Britain, it was ideal to follow the ruling party's perspective^. 
When cellular telephony arose in Hong Kong, there was never a case of having a 
monopoly. This was seen as an opportunity for the Hong Kong Government to 
introduce competition. Thus, early in the 1980's, the government decided to open 
the CPE and value-added service markets, including cellular telephones, and required 
HKTC to adopt separate accounting for competitive services through subsidiary 
6 Interview with John Ure, Director of the Telecommunications Research Project, Centre ofAsian 
Studies, University o fHong Kong on 14 April, 1997. 
7 Interview with John Ure, Director of the Telecommunications Research Project, Centre of Asian 
Studies, University o fHong Kong on 14 April, 1997. 
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company, CSL (Customer Services Ltd.). These three companies, HKTI 
(Hongkong Telecom International), HKTC and CSL, now come under the holding 
company Hongkong Telecom, formed in 1987 following the take-over of HKTC by 
Cable & Wirdess in 1984^ 
Cellular phones came to Hong Kong in 1987. The innovation of cellular 
communication came from overseas countries like Britain and the United States. It 
was Hutchison who got the first idea that the handheld phones would get popular on 
the street. Hong Kong, as a very important financial center in the Asia-Pacific 
region, had to catch up with the standard of communication technologies which was 
developing in other advanced stock markets in London, Tokyo and New York. 
Otherwise the status of Hong Kong as an advanced economic society would be 
greatly threatened because of the lack of a good communication network. Other 
than the financial and stock markets, the survival of many Hong Kong industries 
depended on communication technologies, including transportation services，banking 
services, and so on. Market players also wanted to develop a new and open 
communication business as local and international telephony was run by monopoly. 
With the presence of different pressures, the Government's decision of adopting 
public cellular networks influenced telecommunications and information technology 
policy. Monopoly of telecommunications business was no longer encouraged. The 
liberalization of cellular communication presented a good model for the opening up 
of the domestic telephone networks in 1995 with other related businesses. 
The major factors leading to the liberalization of cellular communication in late 
1980's are mainly technology and overseas experiences of liberalization. Compared 
8 Interview with John Ure, Director of the Telecommunications Research Project^ Centre ofAsian 
Studies, University ofHong Kong on 14 April, 1997. 
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with the other political-economic factors, technology can be regarded as a major 
driving force as well as the most powerful tool for liberalization. Without the 
introduction of cellular technology from overseas countries, the concept of 
monopolizing telecommunications industry will not be challenged. It is technology 
which broadens the scope of telecommunications. The successful overseas 
experiences are accelerators which give the Hong Kong Government a strong 
guarantee in opening up the market to other players. The cellular communication 
sector can be regarded as an initiator in the deregulation and liberalization of the 
telecommunications market. An open cellular communication market is probably a 
tester for the preparation of the opening up of the domestic telephone services. 
The regulator has not exerted very great influence on the market as the decision 
of liberalization is mainly driven by technology and overseas experiences. Indeed 
the regulator is under great pressure, including a certain amount of local pressure 
from the vendors of CPE, to do the job. However, we should admit that the 
regulator has done the first courageous step in changing the regulatory environment 
into a more ‘enlightened’ one. The political condition does not have any 
distinctive effect towards the telecommunications market in the early 1980's to the 
mid-1980's as the Government's perspective towards telecommunications policy is 
consistent throughout the period with little changes. Perhaps the only thing 
regarding the political condition is that the colonial situation ofHong Kong has given 
preference to liberalization following the British trend, bi addition, competition at 
the earliest stage does not get very intense. The influence of capital ownership and 
corporate strategy is least apparent. 
We can conclude that the influence of technology is the greatest, followed by the 
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political factors and the influence of economic factors. 
The Regulator 
Before July 1993, all telecommunications issues were supervised by the 
Telecommunications Branch of the Post Office. ‘The regulatory framework was set 
up in the days when there was a limited number of telecommunications services 
available and monopolies existed in virtually all of those service areas.'^ h mid-
1991, there was a call for setting up an independent body for governing the 
telecommunications sector. The existing regulatory framework received much 
criticism. Ure argued its structure was administration-oriented instead of policy-
planning oriented. The policy-planning procedures included the passing through of 
many stages before getting approval and implementation^®. Besides, ‘the 
Telecommunications Branch, although as a division under the Post Office, was 
indeed under the Economic Services Branch which looked after all sorts of 
disciplines and could not focus its attention on one specific issue.’" ‘The 
Hongkong Telecommunications Users Group (HKTUG), a powerful voice in the 
telecommunications debate with its 110 members representing the territory's largest 
and most powerful finance and trading houses, stated that the biggest problem in 
Hong Kong was not that we had a good policy or bad policy or a competitive policy, 
it was the fact that we did not have a policy.'^^ A Legislative Councilor also 
criticized ‘the Government's lack of public consultation on telecommunications 
policy issues and the policy appeared directionless and undermined public confidence 
9 South China Moming Post, 1 April 1992. 
1�Hong Kong Economic Journal, 30 July 1991. 
“South China Moming Post, 15 November 1991. 
12 South China Moming Post, 19 November 1991. 
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in the administration's ability to keep Hong Kong's telecommunications 
infrastructure abreast of technological advances.''^ Others argued that the existing 
policies were made in a closed-door manner'^. 
Legislators tried to urge the Government to set up an independent body in a 
balanced and impartial manner. ‘The body should comprise members ofthe public， 
telecommunications experts and government officials.''^ A representative of the 
key market player, Hongkong Telecom, stressed that ‘an independent body would 
save the time and costs not only for the telecommunications companies but also for 
the regulator.'i6 
At the earliest stage of criticisms, the Government showed apparent reluctance 
to set up a new body. The Economic Services Branch had already regarded itself as 
an independent body with independent regulatory and licensing powers. In late 
1992，the Telecommunications Authority was set up as a separate Government 
department to keep pace with regulatory and technological changes as the industry. 
It was no longer under the umbrella of the Post Office. The authority was given the 
key power to implement a pro-competitive telecommunications policy. 
This issue shows that the Government's planning of upgrading 
telecommunications services lacks an appropriate direction and is very colonial in 
nature. The situation of the Telecommunications Branch which is headed by the 
Post Office and is also under the Economic Services Branch creates a bureaucratic 
structure. The telecommunications sector is under very close and tight supervision 
under the Hong Kong Government. Although the Government at last decides to 
13 South China Moming Post, 19 November 1991. 
14 South China Moming Post, 1 June, 1992. 
"South China Moming Post, 1 June 1992. 
16 South China Moming Post, 15 November 1991. 
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create a new body, its decision is passively made because of the huge waves of 
public pressure. Moreover, the decision comes too late as the CPE, cellular and 
paging markets have been liberalized early in the mid-1980's to the late 1980's. 
The developments of these markets would have advanced much more rapidly if an 
independent body was set up earlier. The pace of technological and market 
developments was not in conjunction with that of policy-planning. The hesitation 
of the Government's action disturbed the market development. 
The new body is known as OFTA (the Office of the Telecommunications 
Authority)，headed by a Director-General who reports to the Secretary of the 
Economic Services Branch of government, or ESB. It started to operate on 1 July 
1993. OFTA is modeled along the lines of OFTEL in Britain and AUSTEL in 
Australia, from where the Director-General was recruited. ‘In many ways Hong 
Kong has become a test-bed, and a show-case of regulation in the region.,� ' ‘OFTA 
serves as the executive of the Telecommunications Authority (TA), which is 
appointed under the Telecommunications Ordinance (Caption 106) as the statutory 
• • • ，18 body to oversee the regulation of the telecommunications sector in Hong Kong.’ 
The OFTA Trading Fund was established on 1 June 1995 in accordance with 
the Trading Funds Ordinance (Caption 430). The Trading Fund provides OFTA the 
freedom to select the appropriate accounting policies and apply them consistently to 
the authority's operation. With the adoption of trading fund operation, 'OFTA 
enjoys a higher level of flexibility in its operations and is therefore able to respond 
quickly and effectively to the rapidly changing market and the consequent new 
“ U r e , John. 'Telecommunications in China and the Four Dragons.’ Telecommunications in Asia: 
Policy, Planning and Development. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1995. 
pp. 24-25. 
'® OFTA. Trading Fund Report:1995-1996. P.3. 
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demands on the regulatory framework.''^ 
Policy Objectives^® and Functions^^ 
The work of OFTA has been guided by the following three main policy 
objectives: 
參 that the widest range of quality telecommunications services should be available 
to the community at reasonable cost; 
• that the telecommunications services should be provided in the most 
economically efficient manner possible; and 
• that Hong Kong should serve as the pre-eminent communications hub for the 
region now and into the next century. 
‘Notice that the word "competition" does not appear in this policy prescription 
and that is intentional. Competition is a "means" rather than "end" or "objective" in 
its own right.,22 The genuine objective of encouraging competition is to allow the 
development of a free and open cellular communication market. The pricing policy 
is determined by natural market forces in a fully competitive environment. For the 
cellular communication market, there is no formal price control mechanism but the 
consumer prices are encouraged to be set as low as possible. 
Within the new regulatory framework, OFTA adopts a technology neutral 
approach to spectrum allocation for cellular telecommunications services. It does 
not propose to mandate which technology or technologies would be used in the 
19QFTA. Tradmg Fund Report:1995-1996. P.3. 
2° Economic Services Branch, Hong Kong Government. Position Paper: Hong Kong's 
Telecommunications Policy. January, 1994. P.1. 
- 'OFTA. TradingFund Report: 1995-1996. P.5. 
' 'Speech by Alexander A. Arena, former Director-General of OFTA. ‘Deregulation or Re-
regulation?' 6 December 1995. 
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delivery of cellular telecommunications services in Hong Kong. The decisions as to 
which 'licensees take on which technologies will therefore depend on a complex 
interdependency between existing or developing technologies, available spectrum 
and demonstrable consumer benefit.，】； OFTA also adopts a ‘Wo Looking Back" 
rule in which old technology should be replaced by new ones- to ensure effectiveness 
of services. The responsibilities of OFTA include technical regulation, economic 
regulation, radio frequency spectrum management, formulating and administering 
Hong Kong's telephone numbering plan as well as protecting consumer interests 
such as investigating complaints, monitoring service delivery and quality of service 
standards24. 
The Context ofDeregulation in Hong Kong 
According to Ure, deregulation somehow encourages the setting up of a new 
regulatory body to implement new series of regulation^^ His definition can be 
applied to the Hong Kong case as OFTA is a newly formed independent regulator of 
telecommunications. ‘OFTA adopts a consultative approach with industry players as 
the territory moves toward the provision of more diversified and deregulated 
telecommunications services.'^^ 
Horwitz thinks 'deregulation runs against the traditional understanding of 
government regulation as a means of rationalizing the economy andA)r of 
safeguarding the public interest.'^^ He points out that 'deregulation is a political 
' 'S ta tement by Alexander A. Arena, former Director-General of OFTA. ‘The Regulation of Cellular 
, Telecommunications Services in Hong Kong.，November 1994. 
"^  Speech by Alexander A. Arena, former Director-General of OFTA. 'Deregulation or Re-
regulation?' 6 December 1995. 
“ H o n g Kong Economic Journal, 8 April 1989. 
26 Hong Kong Standard, 30 June, 1993. 
“Honvi tz , Robert B.. The Irony of Regulatory Reform: The Deregulation of American 
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process, whereby the economic and political problems enveloping certain industries 
tumed a surprisingly heterogeneous political coalition against continued 
regulation.，28 ！打 the case of telecommunications, there is the interplay of economic, 
technological, legal and ideological forces. 
At the same time, Horwitz emphasizes the process of deregulation in 
telecommunications is unique in four ways. Among the four ways, two can be 
applied to Hong Kong's case. First, 'technological innovation introduces an 
important factor not found in the deregulation of other industries.'^^ Thus, the 
'deregulation of telecommunications is taken to be a consequence of revolution in 
technology.,30 Second, ‘the actual deregulation process in telecommunications is 
centered largely in the regulatory agency, not in Congress.'^' In Hong Kong，the 
regulatory agency is the independent body, OFTA. 
OFTA's position towards deregulation is that ‘it is incorrect to equate 
liberalization and the emergence of competition as deregulation. Nor does it mean 
that we have entered into a new era free of regulation. Instead Hong Kong is in the 
era of sustained re-regulation towards telecommunications.'^^ OFTA's ideology 
towards deregulation can be referred to what Hills says: ‘At the domestic level 
deregulation is a political mechanism of intervention in markets by governments in 
order to reallocate the costs and benefits in regulation.'^^ Deregulation also 
Telecommunications. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989. P .5 . 
28 Honvitz, Robert B.. The Irony ofRegulatory Reform: The Deregulation of American 
Telecommunications. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989. P, 6. 
29 Horwitz, Robert B.. The b"ony ofRegulatory Reform: The Deregulation of American 
Telecommunications, New York: Oxford University Press, 1989. P. 221. 
^°Honvitz, Robert B.. The Irony ofRegulatory Reform: The Deregulation of American 
Telecommunications. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989. P. 5. 
'^ Horwitz, Robert B.. The Irony ofRegulatory Reform: The Deregulation ofAmerican 
Telecommunications. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989. P. 222. 
)2 Speech by Alexander Arena, the former Director-General of OFTA. ‘Deregulation or Re-
regulation?' 6 December 1995. 
“Hi l l s , Jill. Deregulating Telecoms: Competition and Control in the United States, Japan and 
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involves ‘the substitution of market competition for the decisions of regulators.'^^ I 
agree with Hills' perspective in the sense that the Government, to a limited extent, is 
trying to re-make the market into a more free and open situation for more players to 
enter. This corresponds to the idea of "re-regulation". At the same time, OFTA 
regards competition as a means, not an end itself, to achieve deregulation. 
In fact, the past regulatory body in Hong Kong, the Post Office, had been 
responsible for a certain amount of deregulation of the cellular communication sector 
in the 1980's. Since 1983, the introduction of competition from private companies 
in the fields such as paging and cellular telephones had created opportunities for 
relatively new companies such as Hutchison Telecommunications. The first license 
to operate a cellular telephone network was not granted until 1985. The joint 
venture, Hutchison Telephone, launched the first cellular system in Hong Kong to 
cater primarily for portable telephones. In 1987，Hutchison Cellular Data was 
awarded a license to build and operate the world's first public cellular data services 
network;35. Hence, the year "1987" is very significant for the birth of the first 
cellular communication network in Hong Kong. However, competition was not 
intense as the technology used was still the analogue system which did not allow the 
formation ofa network with large capacity and large number of customers. 
The Context of Liberalization in Hong Kong 
Mueller presents a fairly clear definition of liberalization in his work. The 
nature of liberalization consists of four distinct but related changes in the traditional 
- Britain. Westport: Quorum Books, 1986. P.20. 
^ Hills, Jill. Deregulating Telecoms: Competition and Control in the United States, Japan and ， Britain. Westport: Quorum Books, 1986. P.31. 
乂 South China Moming Post, 25 August 1991. 
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order which, taken together, move the provision of telecommunications services out 
of the realm of a government service and into the framework of a market economy. 
One is privatization, the transfer of ownership from the public to the private sector.'^^ 
The case of Hong Kong is that other than the tradition of allowing one firm, 
Hongkong Telecom, to provide public telephone service, the Government encourages 
the private sectors to run the cellular communications services, paging services, the 
CPE businesses and so on. Another change is 'the fostering of competition by 
eliminating or relaxing restrictions on new entry into various telecommunications 
equipment and service markets. The third, and arguably the most important, is the 
move away from vertical integration. In the past, one system supplied 
telecommunications service on an end-to-end basis, from the telephone set to 
switching to long distance lines. Liberalization tends to break down this chain into 
component parts, each supplied by competing, specialized firms.'^^ This situation is 
proved by the cooperation of the CPE market and the cellular communication 
network operators. The operators specialize in running the networks while the CPE 
market performs a supportive role in providing different equipment, such as the 
handsets and other accessories, to the customers. The fourth aspect of liberalization 
is the 'rationalization' of prices. The competitive forces unleashed by 
liberalization undermine the averaged rate schemes on which telecommunications 
36 Mueller, Milton. 'Contested Terrain: Hong Kong's International Telecommunications on the 
Eve of 1997，in Edward A. Comor (ed.), The Global Political Economy ofCommunication: 
Hegemony, Telecommunication and the Information Economy QsIew York: St. Martin's Press, 
1944) p.l28. 
“Mueller, Milton. ‘Contested Terrain: Hong Kong's International Telecommunications on the 
Eve of 1997' in Edward A. Comor (ed.), The Global Political Economy of Communication: 
Hegemony, Telecommunication and the Information Economy Qvlew York: St. Martin's Press 
1944)p.l28. 
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tariffs were based, compelling carriers to realign rates.’ The experience of the 
Hong Kong cellular communication market shows that as competition gets more 
intense, prices of cellular phone handsets as well as service charges drop rapidly. 
In Hong Kong, other political-economic reasons and the technology factor that 
pushed the Government to liberalize the cellular communication market, overseas 
pressure also constituted a significant part in changing the telecommunications 
environment. The calls for liberalization of telecommunications markets have been 
strongest from powerful U.S. lobbies. The United States seeks to establish its 
technological and economic leadership in the world trade services. The majority of 
records and databases are centered in the United States. Global business demands the 
right of free passage of such information around the world^^. The free-market views 
in the United States appealed to the Reagan administration in the 1980's and were a 
significant influence on the practice of U.S. competition policy in those years^ ®. 
The representative of the United States Federal Communications Commission 
stressed Hong Kong's economic status could be usurped by Singapore if the territory 
failed to liberalize its telecommunications. The U.S. body wanted Hong Kong to 
lead Asia in liberalizing telecommunications^ ^ . Hong Kong is being regarded as a 
very important place of liberalizing the telecommunications market since it is 
probably the only possible gateway for overseas investors to make business 
connections with China which is still largely adopting a closed-door policy towards 
38 Mueller, Milton. ‘Contested Terrain: Hong Kong's International Telecommunications on the 
Eve of 1997' in Edward A. Comor (ed.), The Global Political Economy of Communication: 
Hegemony,-Telecommunication and the Information Economy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1944)p.l28. 
39 Hills, Jill. Deregulating Telecoms: Competition and Control in the United States, Japan and 
Britain. Westport: Quorum, 1986. P.2. 
40 Consumer Council Competition Policy: The Key to Hong Kong's Future Economic Success. 
November 1996. P.17. 
41 South China Moming Post, 12 October 1996. 
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telecommunications and rejecting foreign investment. The French 
telecommunications giant Alcatel Alsthom foresees that by the year 1997, China and 
Hong Kong will open a new era in their relationship for which the homogeneity of 
the telecommunications network will play a major role and Alcatel is prepared to 
support the closer links between the two^^. In the 1990's, foreign players in Hong 
Kong included major U.S. companies that had followed their domestic customers 
overseas, such as AT&T，MCI, Infonet，NYNEX, US West, General Electric 
Information Service, KDD of Japan and British Telecom^^. Giving these companies 
more room to maneouvre in the Hong Kong market should result in a wider range of 
services to Hong Kong business. Hong Kong has absolutely become the focal point 
for international carriers seeking a bigger presence not just in China, but in the Asia-
Pacific region. 
Furthermore, Hong Kong, as one of the most successful financial centers in the 
world, has to catch up with other financial stock markets including those in London, 
New York and Tokyo. These places have experienced liberalization and 
competition in telecommunications. Cheaper and better telecommunications 
services are available for the business enterprises in these places^^. To maintain a 
similar status with these financial centers, Hong Kong needs to have similar 
communication networks so as to keep a similar pace with these places. 
Hong Kong is only one of 10 out of 123 WTO (World Trade Organization) 
members who have put forward offers to open their telecommunications sectors to 
greater foreign participation as part of the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
»*> 
42 Hong Kong Standard, 19 February 1994. 
43 Hong Kong Standard, 21 June 1990. 
44 Hong Kong Economic Journal, 18 September 1990. 
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(GATS)45. So far, Hong Kong WTO negotiators have volunteered to allow foreign 
participation in the territory's cellular telephony, wireless data, paging and facsimile 
businesses46. 
The Context of Competition in Hong Kong 
The Government would like to create an active, vibrant and responsive 
telecommunications markets which are consumer-oriented through the introduction 
of competition. As Arena has said for OFTA that competition is a means, not an 
end to itself, to create a dynamic market. OFTA is also well-equipped to take 
punitive action against non-competitive practices. ‘If one enterprises as a monopoly 
of the market its behavior is likely to be exploitative to consumers and prices will be 
fixed considerably above costs.'^^ ‘It is a generally accepted presumption that 
competition is in the public interest. It is the pressure of competitors that 
disciplines the behavior of firms. Absent these pressures, firms may overprice 
products and eam excess profits at the expense of consumers; or, firms may lack the 
motivation to reduce costs and to innovate.'^^ Competition benefits the consumer in 
terms of choice, quality of service, price and product innovation. 
However, one critic comments that the benefits of competition have to be 
determined by the availability of spectrum^^. The reason is that it is the 
Government who allocates the spectrum. If the spectrum given does not support a 
45 Hong Kong Standard, 6 October 1995. 
46 Hong Kong Standard, 2 March 1996. 
47 Hills, Jill. Deregulating Telecoms: Competition and Control in the United States, Japan and 
Britain. Westport: Quorun, 1986. P.30. 
48 Subissati, Ezio. 'Subsidized Entry，Regulated Competition and Public Policy in 
Telecommunications in Canada’ in J. Miller (ed.), Telecommunications and Equity: Policy 
Research Issues. Q^orth-Holland: Elsevier Publishers B. V.，1986) p.64. 
49 Interview with K. W. Fu,joumalist o fHong Kong Economic Journal, on 9 April 1997. 
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large capacity of consumers, then competition is useless. This is similar to the case 
ofthe cellular communication market in the late 1980's to the early 1990's where the 
system was still the old analogue one which did not favor large amount of customers 
because ofthe low capacity. During that period, competition was not intense. 
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Chapter 2 
Oligopoly of the Cellular Communication market 
in 
the Digital Era 
The Cellular Phone Market 
Between 1987 and 1991, Hong Kong's cellular phone market was dominated by 
Hutchison Telephone, Communications Services Ltd. (CSL), a subsidiary of 
Hongkong Telecom, and China Telephone, which was renamed as Pacific Link 
nowadays. Before the liberalization of the telecommunications market, the 
capacity of serving cellular phone users was limited by the narrow range of radio 
frequencies. All three companies were keeping a watch on the latest developments in 
the hope of expanding markets!. The companies at that period were running the old 
analogue system. There were altogether four cellular phone networks, two owned 
by Hutchison Telephone and the other two owned by CSL and Pacific Link 
respectively. As mentioned in the previous chapter, cellular phone service was first 
brought into Hong Kong by Hutchison Telephone through a joint venture. The 
earliest cellular phone was known as 'Big Brother’ and was regarded as the First 
Generation Cordless Telephone. Hutchison Telephone. had about 60% market 
share in the 1980's , claiming to be the company of the top most sales. 
Although there were three cellular phone operators at that time, competition was 
not intense. The basic reason was that the old analogue phone systems of the 
operators had reached saturation level in the late 1980's. The system did not have 
‘Hong Kong Standard, 29 November, 1988. 
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farther capacity to accept new users^. The telecommunications market, before the 
1990's, was not competitive as the number of users had already been limited by the 
imperfect technology. Figure 1 shows that compared with other advanced countries 
in the world, the average penetration rate of cellular phone usage in Hong Kong was 
relatively low in the late 1980’s. 
Figure 1. The Cellular Phone Usage of Different Countries^ 
Country Telecommunications Market Share 
System (per 1000 capita) 
Norway NMT 32.9 
Sweden NMT 24.4 
Iceland NMT 24.4 
Finland NMT 18.2 
Denmark NMT 17.4 
USA AMPS 6.5 
UK TACS 6.5 
Canada AMPS 5.9 
Austria NMT 4.1 
Hong Kong AMPS ^ 
Note; 
NMT Nordic Cellular Telecommunications. A Scandinavian analogue cellular 
standard typically operating within the 400 Mhz or 900 Mhz frequencies. 
AMPS Advanced Cellular Phone System. A North American analogue cellular 
system typically operating within the 800 Mhz frequency. 
TACS Total Access Communications System. UK analogue cellular system 
typically operating within the 900 Mhz frequency. 
The Digital Era 
As the analogue system became overloaded, the quality of signaling could fall 
significantly^. Accompanied with the liberalization of the industry after the release 
of the consultancy report in 1988，the Government ran a feasibility study for the 
2 Hong Kong Economical Journal, 19 February, 1989. 
3 Hong Kong Economic Journal, 19 February, 1989. 
4 South China Moming Post, 21 January, 1992. 
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introduction of a digital system by 1992^ ln 1991，the Government started to y S 
introduce digital public cellular radio-telephone services in the territory. Once the 
system was in operation, people would enjoy more efficient and higher quality 
transmission with hand-held phones. Digital cellular communications at that time 
was a breakthrough technology. Voice quality would be significantly better, data 
services would be more easily offered, the system would be more secure and digital 
uses available frequency spectrum far more economically^. The new system was 
also expected to increase two to three times the market potential of 120,000 cellular 
phone users within the available frequency range?. In November 1990，the Post 
'j 
Office issued the Government's Digital Cellular Telephone Consultative Paper and 
then issued five licenses for digital cellular phone services in addition to the old 
analogue cellular services. According to Alexander Arena, the criteria for granting 
the licenses depended on what spectrum was available at that time. Technology and 
spectrum had been the two things that had really dictated physically how many 
licenses one could have. In the early 1990's, regulators knew there was the need to 
migrate to digital technology^. Lti 1991，the existing service operators at that time 
were all granted the newJicenses and continued to operate the four existing networks. 
In other words, a new operator was needed to get the new fifth license. Bidders 
were invited to compete for the new digital phone service license. There were ten 
consortiums bidding for the license and the Post Office only invited four of them for 
further discussion and consideration. At last, in July 1992, the new license was 
granted to Smartcom Ltd. (which was also known as Smartone). After six months, 
5 Hong Kong Standard, 17 November, 1988. 
6 South China Moming Post, 28 July 1992. 
‘Hong Kong Standard, 17 November, 1988. 
8 Interview with Alexander Arena, former Director-General of OFTA, on 14 April 1997. 
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the digital phone system started to operate. Pacific Link and one of the Hutchison's 
networks adopted the North American digital standard known as Digital AMPS 
(Advanced cellular Phone System). Hongkong Telecom CSL, Smartone and 
Hutchison's other remaining network selected the European standard called GSM 
(Global System for Cellular)^. It was the launching of the digital network which 
sparked intense competition among the operators. Unlike other markets overseas 
where cellular services are originally seen as ‘car-phones, and over 50% of cellular 
services are in fact 'car-phones', here in Hong Kong our market has always has 
already had a strong ‘people-phone, element and over 97% of cellular services are 
already personal cellular services'®. 
The Cellular Phone Operators 
Cellular phone operators need very strong financial backup so as to establish 
their cellular networks at a huge cost. Moreover, it is very costly in the 
recruitment of professionals and manpower to run the business. In such a 
competitive environment, marketing and corporate strategies are essential tools to 
attract customers. Hence, the identification of capital ownership of the operators 
helps to analyze the complexity ofthe liberalization process. 
Each of the four existing cellular phone operators had a very solid structure of 
ownership backing up their businesses. The shareholders have their own distinctive 
background. For CSL, it is a subsidiary of the Hongkong Telecom. Hongkong 
Telecom's parent company is Britain's Cable & Wireless. The shareholding 
'South China Moming Post, 15 December 1992. 
1�Speech by Alexander Arena, ‘A Regulator's View on the Emerging Cellular yTCS Market', on 21 
October 1996. 
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structure is divided into three major parts: Cable & Wireless (58.4%), China 
ktemational Trust and hvestment Corporation (CITIC) (10%) and public 
shareholders (31.6%). Among the public shareholders, many are American 
institutional investors. Shares are listed on the Hong Kong, New York and Padfic 
Stock Exchanges. Hongkong Telecom is Hong Kong's only M\ service 
telecommunications provider, marketing a complete range of quality voice and data 
telecommunications services backed by a state-of-the-art fully digital fibre optic 
network. The company has ten offices in seven countriesn. It is always looking 
for closer partnerships with China investors. Notice that one of its shareholders, 
CITIC, has a very Chinese background. 'CITIC is headed by Larry Yung, one of 
Greater China's richest men. He is the son of Rong Yiren, a Deng Xiaoping 
intimate who founded CITIC. CITIC is answerable not to its ministry (as is the 
case with other state-run enterprises), but directly to the State Council, China's 
cabinet. On a day-to-day basis, there is no direct interference in CITIC from Beijing. 
Nor need there be, because as long as they continue with their present success, 
intervention of any kind could only impede their stunning progress. CITIC has 
become a highly lucrative and intensely capitalist corporation.,�� The interesting 
shareholding structure composed of British and Chinese interests indeed shows the 
intention ofHongkong Telecom in their business direction. 
Another operator, Hutchison Telephone, was formed in 1986 to spearhead the 
Hutchison Whampao group in the territory's paging and cellular phone business. In 
fact，its parent company, Hutchison Whampao Limited Hong Kong, has been in 
“Hongkong Telecom. Annual Report 1996. P. 1. 
'"Cragg’ Claudia. The New Taipans: A Vital Source Book on the People and Business of the 
Pacific Rim. London: Century, 1995. P. 116. 
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telecommunications for more than 10 years with its move into radio telephones in 
1983 to 1984 via Hutchison Telephone. Hutchison Whampao holds 70% of 
‘ Hutchison Telephone's shares and the remaining 30% held by the U.S.-based 
Motorola, hi 1989, the group entered into telecommunications outside of the 
territory. Hutchison Whampao is a Hong Kong-based conglomerate owned by the 
'taipan's taipan', Li Ka-Shing^^ 'Li is on the PRC Preliminary Working 
Committee and Beijing's Advisory Board for Hong Kong. His immense investment 
in China has won him the distinction ofbeing dubbed a patriot by Chinese premier Li 
Peng.,i4 Li, as a Hong Kong business giant, unavoidably has some political 
connections with China. This is definitely an advantage for the conglomerate's 
future business. 
According to Asiaweek, the top companies in Hong Kong in the 1990's are the 
Hong Kong & Shanghai Bank, China Light & Power, Hong Kong 
Telecommunications, Cathay Pacific, Mass Transit Railway Corporation, and 
Hutchison Whampao in terms of the history, scope and success of business 
developments. The information shows CSL and Hutchison Telephone are 
subsidiaries of Hong Kong's top companies. These top companies usually have a 
very long history of running their businesses in Hong Kong and they are very 
important strategic businesses covering finance, public transport, air transport, public 
electric utility as well as telecommunications in supporting a country. 
. Pacific Link is mainly owned by First Pacific (60%), a listed company in Hong 
Kong,_ British cellular telephone giant Vodafone (30%) and Sun Hung Kai Hong 
13 Cragg, Claudia. The New Taipans: A Vital Source Book on the People and Business of the 
Pacific Rim. London: Century, 1995. P. 25. 
14 Cragg, Claudia. The New Taipans: A Vital Source Book on the People and Business of the 
Pacific Rim. London: Century, 1995. P. 118. 
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Kong tidustries (10%). Smartone is led by the Sun Hung Kai Properties (40%), the 
U.S.-based AT&T (30%)，ABC Communications (Holdings) (15%) and Town Kahn 
(15%), a Hongkong-based company owned by China's Ministry of Post and 
Telecommunications. 
The above investigation helps to summarize the major types of capital interests 
in Hong Kong's existing cellular communication market. The major types of 
interests include: U.K., local Chinese, PRC Chinese, U.S., etc. The cooperation 
between local Chinese and PRC Chinese is not uncommon in the cellular industry. 
It is arguable that there should be come political considerations linked with economic 
interests. As Hong Kong has to experience China's takeover, telecommunications 
shareholding structure is naturally being affected by the political condition. In 
addition, there is the concentration of power in the hands of the four conglomerates. 
They are controlling the market through competition among themselves. 
Corporate Strategy in a Competitive Environment 
The cellular phone market in Hong Kong has created a cellular phone explosion. 
Within ten years' time, the status ofthe cellular phone has changed dramatically. In 
the 1980's, cellular phone was regarded as a status symbol. Li those days, the price 
of getting a cellular phone was so high that subscribers were limited to the rich, the 
professionals and senior businessmen. During the 1990's, the charge for cellular 
services decreased dramatically. The most apparent force leading to such change 
was market competition under liberalization. Competition took place when the 
digital phone network developed and invited a large number of customers to take 
part in the market. Since the digital network increased the capacity of operation, 
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the operators raised a price war in order to obtain the highest market share. There 
were new kinds of subscribers, including salesmen, small businessmen, those in the 
service industry and in the China trade, students and even housewives. 
bi 1989，the cost of most cellular phone handsets ranged from about HK$15,000 
to HK$30,000. In 1991, the cost dropped to between HK$7,000 and HK$20,000. 
The price even decreased to the range between HK$4,000 and HK$15,000 in 1994. 
In 1996, the price dropped further to between HK$4,000 and HK$5,000. Recently, an 
ordinary type ofhandsetjust costs HK$l,500 to HK$2,000. 
The charges per minute are always more or less similar among the four 
operators as they are competing with one another. Figure 2 presents a comparison 
table which shows the charges per minute among the operators in mid-1995. 
Figure 2. Comparison of Charges per Minute among the Four Cellular 
Operators in mid-1995^^ 
Company Charges Per Minute OHKS/mm.)* 
Peak Hours Non-Peak Hours 
HKTelecom CSL 1.80-3.80 1.00- 1.80 
Hutchison Telephone 2.00 - 5.00 一 
Pacific Link 1.95 - 4.75 Free or up to 1.95 
Smartone 1.60 - 4.00 1.20 - 4.00 
*The charges per minute depends on the customers' selections o f the 
monthly service plans. 
The above information shows that the range of charges were indeed very identical 
among the four players, ln fact, the players were always changing their marketing 
strategies and tools, sometimes without notification in advance so as to achieve an 
'^  Hong Kong Economic Journal, 30 May 1995. 
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advantage against the other rivals as well as stimulate the attention of the consumers. 
In early 1996，competition among the players was so fierce that they started 
giving away handsets. Figure 3 shows all of the them came up with rival 
introductory packages in early 1996. Telecom CSL started a “buy one, get one free” 
special offer. Pacific Link went one further step and began offering new customers 
handsets for a token HK$1. Monthly charges were also drastically reduced. The 
monthly charges ranged from HK$375 to HK$840. 
Figure 3. Cellular Phone User Costs in early 1996^^ 
HK Telecom CSL Hutchison GSM Smartone GSM |~~Pacific L i n k ~ Hutchison CDMA 
Buy 1 B u y 2 Buy 1 B u y 2 Buy 1 Buy2 Buy 1 B u y 2 Buy 1 B u y 2 
Phone S4,950 $4,950 S3,880 S7,660 S5,600 $11,200 S1 $2 S4,380 S8,760 
Cost 
Monthly S840~"Sl,548 S650 Sl,300"~S540 Sl,080 S595~~Sl，190~~S3^ S750 
Tariff (S840+ (S650 ($540 (S595 (S375 
S7p8) x2) x2) x i ) x2) 
1 Year S10,080 S18,576 $7,800 S15,600 S6,480 $12,960 S7,140 S14,280 S4,500 S9,000 
Tariff 
1 Year Cost $15,030 S23,52G $11,680 $23,360 S12,080 S24,160 S7,141 S14,282 S8,880 S17,760 
• 
Relative to 一 ~ ~ ~ ~ - 2 2 % -1% -20% 3 % - 5 2 % ~ ~ - 3 9 % ~ ~ - 4 1 % ~ ~ - 2 5 % 
H K T e l e c o m | | | | | 
Source: Jard ine Fleming 
From the above figure, it is noticeable that HK Telecom CSL offered the ‘buy 
one, get one free，plan, its monthly service plan was still expensive as it required a 
high monthly tariff. Other operators, in reaction to CSL's strategy, charged a cheaper 
monthly tariff. Pacific Link even slashed the price of handset to HK$1 for buying 
one and $2 for two, making the cheapest service plan either for one handset or two. 
With handset prices down, monthly charges becomes a bigger priority in the 
16 South China Moming Post, March 1996. 
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cost of becoming a cellular phone user. The operators developed another strategy to 
attract customers. They introduced the low-volume and high-volume user plans 
with different charges so as to suit different customers' demands. Besides, in late 
1996，three operators, including CSL, Smartone and Hutchison, introduced new 
value-added service into cellular phones: Cellular phones with a paging service in 
Chinese. The trend was that the popularity of paging services had been wiped away 
by cellular services when the cost of getting a cellular phone was very similar to that 
ofa pager. In order to survive, paging operators tried to combine their services with 
cellular communication. Another reason for the combination was that sometimes 
the coverage of cellular network was insufficient, making unclear signals and 
difficult connection with cellular phone users. People wanted to make sure that they 
could be contacted and they needed to subscribe to a pager operator in which paging 
offered a more secure pattem of coverage. In addition, the operators introduced a 
roaming service which enabled users to keep in touch with others by the existing 
Hong Kong cellular number. Cellular users could receive calls without changing 
their contact numbers when they are out of town. 
The rival price war was getting more and more intense, with charges per minute 
decreasing to around HK$1 during both peak and non-peak hours. Monthly tariffwas 
also dropping to an unbelievable level. For example, Hutchison's CDMA digital 
network, a fairly new product, offered the monthly service plan with the lowest 
monthly charge, 'HK$190', with 100 minutes of free airtime. There was also the 
innovation of “Owl Time" (non-peak hours) which charged only HK$0.6 per 
minute, the cheapest offer in town. The existing four digital network operators tried 
to strengthen the customer base well before the coming of the new PCS operators 
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through the reduction of prices so as to stand firm in the market. With the 
introduction of attractive price cutting packages, the operators hoped that customers 
would not migrate to the new PCS networks that would be launched in 1997. 
Other than slashing the price of handsets and monthly service, connection fees 
also dropped rapidly and suddenly. Di early 1994, OFTA issued a report outlining 
the reduction in telephone prices and connection fees. The report was prompted by 
consumer complaints that prices were significantly higher than overseas and by 
complaints about the difficulties connecting to networks. After discussions with the 
Government, the four market players agreed to slash their connection fees. Figure 4 
shows that the connection fees were dropped by between 22% and 60%. OFTA said 
inquiries were made and enough evidence was uncovered that connections fees were 
higher than necessary to recover costs, and could restrict competition^^. 
Figure 4. Connection Charges of Cellular Operators^® 
Network Operator Connection Fees New Fees Decreased 
as ofMarch 1994 Percentage 
Hongkong Telecom CSL HKS2,000 HKS800 6 ^ 
Hutchison Telephone HKS2,000 HK$1000 50% 
Pacific Link HKS2,000 HK$1000 50% 
Smartone HKS1,000 HK$780 22% 
In retrospect, each of the operators tried their own marketing strategies to 
expand the market share. CSL set up a new subsidiary, One 2 Free, to target the 
mass market as a contrast to the existing CSL network, GSM 1010，which was 
17 South China Moming Post, 30 April 1994. 
'^ South China Moming Post, 30 April 1994 & Sing Tao Jih Pao, 30 April 1994. 
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originally targeting business users. The overall monthly service charges were 
between HK$200 and HK$400, which was much cheaper than that ofthe GSM 1010 
network. There were up to ten types of handsets of different designs with seven 
different service plans. The objective of One 2 Free was to attract young customers 
for leisure communication at an affordable price as well as to prepare a firm market 
base in order to counteract the more severe competition with the coming ofPCS. 
In regard to Hutchison's Telephone, it succeeded in bidding for a PCS license. 
As an existing operator, the company took the earliest advantage in promoting its 
PCS services. At the same time, it continued to market its new CDMA and GSM 
digital networks. The company was making a very large investment in advertising its 
products by employing TV stars and top singers in promoting the networks, products 
and services. 
Pacific Link was trying to remake the company's image and upgrade the 
standard of network coverage. The company participated in charity activities to 
establish a new company image as well as to attract the public's attention. This was 
in fact part of the company's strategy for advertising and promotion. Smartone 
failed to get a PCS license. The company admitted that it would teher cut its tariff 
ifthe new PCS operators eroded its market share. 
Estimates shows that two out of four operators were expanding their market 
share (see Figure 5) at the same rate. In addition, handset suppliers were also 
competing with one another (see Figure 6). Motorola used to be the most popular 
brand favored by cellular users. However, another rival, Ericsson，adopted strong 
marketing and advertising tools to strive for a larger share, bi 1996，Ericsson got 
the same share as Motorola. 
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Figure 5. Estimate of Cellular Communication Market Share 
at the End of 1995^^ 
Operators Estimate of Market Share at the end of 1995 
Hongkong Telecom CSL 32.2% 
Hutchison Telephone 15.3% 
Pacific Link 32.2% 
Smartone 20.3% 
Figure 6. Market Share Structure of the Cellular Handset Suppliers^° 
Handset Suppliers Market Share Increased / Decreased 
Percentage in 1996 
Motorola 37% -22% 
Ericsson 37% +12% 
Nokia 10% -10% 
Panasonic 8% —— 
Others 8% +2% 
The Power of Oligopoly 
The position of the regulator is pro-competitive towards the telecommunications 
market. There will be intervention if anti-competitive activities are present. In 
1994，there was a case of anti-competitive activities among the market players. The 
telecommunications watchdog investigated an alleged price-rigging meeting held by 
the four cellular phone operators. Each of the four operators received a written 
notice from OFTA for an explanation of the meeting. Lm fact, the main weapon 
OFTA has to safeguard competition is the granting and revoking of licenses to 
operate telephone services. However, the licenses do not specifically prohibit 
' 'Eastem Express, 27 December 1995. 
-° N4ing Pao, 16April 1997. 
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competitors from holding meetings to agree on price cuts, but they do restrict anti-
competitive conduct in general. 
The case mentioned above reflects the cellular communication market is run by 
an oligopoly. Li the case of oligopoly (when there are relatively few firms), firms 
will have some degree of market power, which will be increased if they are able to 
collude and thus impose their collective power over the market. Ln general, the 
greater degree of market concentration on the supply side, the more asymmetrical the 
interdependence between producers and consumers, to the disadvantage of the latter. 
The main characteristic of oligopolistic competition is that ‘the behavior of one firm 
will be affected by its anticipation of the behavior of rival firms.'^^ It is a market 
situation in which control over the supply of a commodity is held by a small number 
of producers, each of whom is able to influence prices and thus directly affect the 
position of competitors. Oligopoly implies the more the power, the more the 
advantage. Mueller sees the Hong Kong cellular communication market as a 
definite oligopoly since the operators are all above competitive levels and they are 
making monopoly profits. Moreover, the oligopoly situation, although it does not 
seem to involve explicit among the four players, they coordinate their behaviors 
because there are so few firms in the market^^. 
My view towards the situation is that the small number of operators does 
constitute a large degree of market power in the hands of the few players. They 
are able to exert influence over the price of handsets, monthly tariff and even 
connection fees. Through their competitive interaction, they are constructing a 
21 Gill, S. & Law, D.. The Global Political Economy: Perspectives, Problems and Policies. New 
York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1988. P.42. 
22 Interview with Milton Mueller, Visiting Scholar, Department of Information and Systems 
Management, School ofBusiness and Management, The Hong Kong University of Science and 
Technology, on 15 April 1997. 
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power sharing relationship. Although the players' power is so large, consumers still 
enjoy benefits. The players are not loath to reduce prices. Oligopoly in this case 
does benefit consumers to a large extent but at the same time it threatens the survival 
of the players as they have to pay a high cost to react to competition. This is evident 
that some operators use the monthly tariff or other related charges to subsidize the 
low handset charges. OFTA has done a monitoring job in supervising the 
oligopoly. Perhaps the only shortcoming of oligopoly to consumers is the limited 
choice of operators but not that of products and services in Hong Kong's case. 
The Expansion of the Market 
While the price of getting cellular services dropped, the number of subscribers 
increased rapidly OFigure 7). 
Figure 7. Number of Subscribers (1987-1996) 
Year No. of Subscribers % Annual Increase 
12/ 1987 28,060 180% 
12/ 1988 51,280 82% 
12/ 1989 89,193 74% 
12/ 1990 133,912 50% 
12/1991 189,664 42% 
12/ 1992 233,324 23% 
12/ 1993 290,843 25% 
12/ 1994 431,775 48% 
12/ 1995 687,600 59% 
12/ 1996 1,210,680 62% 
It was obvious that between 1992 and 1993 the percentage increase was relatively 
lower than that between 1994 and 1996. The reason was simply because 
digitalization, as a breakthrough technology introduced in 1992，was marketed with 
high handset, tariff and airtime price. Connection fee was also expensive. In 
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those days not many people were able to afford the combination of various charges 
in getting a cellular phone. While competition was getting more and more intense 
with prices getting lower, the rate of penetration had been incredibly advancing. 
The first impetus prompting competition in the cellular communication market 
in the digital era is the technological pressure. The situation between the early 
1990's and the mid-1990's was similar to that between the mid-1980's and the late 
1980's when liberalization of cellular communication took place, hi both situations 
liberalization and competition were first driven by technological pressure. While in 
the 1990's technological pressure was even more intense and apparent. The 
capacity of digitalization altered incentives about both the cellular equipment and 
services markets. 
In regard to the regulator, OFTA directly initiated the adoption of digitalization. 
It had made the regulatory environment freer than that in the 1980's. It had 
facilitated the interests of players and the interests of consumer choice, efficiency and 
competitiveness, allowing the market to develop in its own way. Otherwise the 
prices of cellular services would still remain high. OFTA's job in checking anti-
competitive activities and persuading the operators to cut connection fees helped the 
market to diffuse the technology in a faster rate. 
In investigating the job of market players, they had enough market power to 
manipulate the situation. A power sharing relationship was developed when they 
strove to increase the market share. The strong capital power of the players at the 
same time enabled them to invest big money in advertising, promotion and 
technological improvement. 
The factors of technology，regulatory environment, capital ownership as well as 
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corporate strategy are simultaneously competing and striving for more power to 
accelerate the competitiveness of the liberalized market. It is the interplay of these 
forces which result in a dynamic market. During this period, political conditions do 
not impose a great effect on the market. 
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Chapter 3 
The Irony of a Free Market Place 
Personal Communications Services ^PCS) — A Technology for the 
Late 1990's 
In 1991，Government officials began to plan for the introduction of Personal 
Communications Services (PCS) in Hong Kong. No time scale had been set for the 
implementation of PCS at that time!, hi the early 1990's, it was estimated that the 
». 
use of cellular communication was growing so fast that in Hong Kong the existing 
capacity would be used up in three to five years. 
PCS represent in concept the biggest telecommunications innovation since the ‘ 
introduction of the cellular phone. Essentially, 'PCS will use ultra-light cordless 
• 
phones to give customers cheap two-way communications whether they are at home, 
at work or anywhere else in transit. PCS entail assigning to customers personal 
telephone contact numbers, which they keep irrespective of where they live, work or 
i 
move. The radio coverage will be provided by a huge honeycomb oftiny microcells 
operating at high frequency. The handsets will consequently operate on less battery 
power and be cheap to produce. It is estimated that the price of handsets will be 
decreased by 20% to 30% and monthly tariffby 50%.'^ 
Like other digital technologies, PCS gives network operators greater flexibility 
in designing their services than older analogue technologies, meaning that they are 
more easily able to build personalized services for specific customers. For the 
‘South China Moming Post, 10 September, 1991. 
2 Hong Kong Economic Journal, 26 July 1995. 
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cellular users, ‘that is good news as they will be able to tailor the communications 
"package" they purchase. It might include functions such as a paging or message 
service and cellular phone service bundled into a single payment package to suit their 
needs.,3 
‘To set up a PCS system in Hong Kong, the initial issue for the Postmaster 
General was to decide which radio frequencies could be used for the service.'^ The 
frequencies suitable for operating PCS in Hong Kong were mostly used by Hongkong 
Telecom and the Government. The Government had considered opening up the 
frequencies for cellular services and there was a plan already^ , 
Presently, the number of cellular phone customers already exceeds 1 million (a 
penetration of 17%) and is still increasing at a steady 2 to 4 per cent monthly growth 
over the past months. The customer base for public cellular services is expected to 
reach 2 to 2.5 million by the year 2005 ^ The number of subscribers by the end of 
I 
1996 already reached the saturation level at about 1.2 million of the existing 
networks. PCS would ultimately allow an extra amount of about 1.2 million 
cellular telephone users?. Thus, PCS greatly enlarges the customer base of the 
cellular communication market. The capacity of the network is so large that the 
Government is willing to give up the required frequencies to set up the network for 
the public. There are altogether six PCS licenses to be issued. Li the coming years, 
the six licensees will invest a total of more than 60 billion Hong Kong dollars in the 
establishment of PCS networks and create 2,500 job vacancies in the 
3 South China Moming Post, 1 December 1995. 
4 South China Moming Post, 10 September, 1991. 
5 South China Moming Post, 10 September, 1991. 
6 OFTA Newsletter, Issue No. 5，December 1996. 
7 South China Moming Post, 17 May, 1994. 
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g telecommunications sector . ‘ 
The Changing Regulatory Environment 
The regulatory framework for PCS is still working along a technology-neutral 
approach which means interested parties can select different types of systems and 
technologies for the same type of telecommunications service. OFTA,s decision of 
opening up the PCS market showed its intention to stimulate the scope of 
competition and upgrade of cellular technology from a consumer-oriented 
perspective. One theory suggests that the licenses can be simply granted to the four ‘ 
existing digital network operators. However, OFTA did not choose to do- so as 
more business opportunities should be granted to new entrants to provide more 
choices of services and products. This indicated OFTA's initiative in advancing to 
a free market philosophy. 
The shortlisting criteria included financial capability, technical capability, 
management and technical expertise as well as corporate structure^. The 
shortlisting procedure helped to screen out the ineligible candidates. An additional 
consideration was that if the shareholding structure of a corporation was not very 
firmly established, the opportunity of getting the license would be naturally affected'®. 
Another notion was that if the bidder was very familiar with Hong Kong's 
telecommunications environment with active participation history in Hong Kong's 
telecommunications services, the chance of successful bidding would generally be 
®Sing Tao Jih Pao, 28 July 1996. 
9 Speech by Alexander Arena, former Director-General of OFTA, ‘The Regulation of 
Cellular Telecommunications Services in Hong Kong，’ in November 1994. 
'° Ming Pao, 19 November 1994. 
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greater!丨.In this sense, capital ownership and business history of the bidders were 
taken into account in a fairly subjective way. The shortlisting procedure could not 
be regarded as totally objective and fair as it would not accept bidders who met all of 
the mentioned criteria but lacked of active participation experiences in the field. 
The subjective remarks also forbid corporations which did not possess a firmly 
established shareholding structures to enter the market. This meant only 
conglomerates, joint-ventures or giant business groups with very strong economic 
and technological resources were eligible to apply. This situation really touches on 
the notions of power and equity and corresponds to Buchanan's argument that in the 
political-economic 'game', although each person has the ‘equality of starting 
position', this does not mean that all are equal and qualified to enter the game. 
Thus, 'equality of opportunity，is just an ideal only. In the licensing of PCS, the 
power to manipulate was always in the hands of the economically strongest ones. 
The power to choose was only in the hand of OFTA as the selection procedure was 
kept confidential. 
The Interplay of Politics and Economics 
The PCS case brings out an important notion that the cellular communication 
market, as an entity of economics, is mingled with politics. The reason is that the 
PCS licenses are being granted for 10 years, meaning that it is a matter that straddles 
1997. Any matter that straddles 1997 has to be approved by the JLG (Joint Liaison 
Group) formed by both British and Chinese officials.. PCS licensing is a sensitive 
issue being discussed at a sensitive time as the Sino-British relationship is said to be 
“ H o n g Kong Economic Journal, 25 August 1994. 
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fluctuating in the 1990's. 
ln 1994，OFTA issued the Personal Communications Network Consultative 
Paper and the call for applications was set for the third quarter of 1994, with licenses 
to be issued in the first quarter of 1995 ^^  . It was expected that PCS would start to 
operate in late 1995 or early 1996 ^^ . However, the result was that licenses were 
issued in late 1996 and the first PCS operator started its operation in early 1997. 
The delay was due to the conflicts and disputes between the officials of the British 
and Chinese side. 
In March 1995, OFTA received 14 proposals for six PCS licenses. Licenses 
were intended to be issued in the coming August, but the Chinese team leader of JLG, 
Chen Zuo'er, said 'the Chinese delegates had never discussed the issue with the 
British JLG members''^ after the leakage of the estimated list of successful bidders . 
The key conflicting issues about the PCS licenses are summarized as follows: 
- D a t e The British Side The Chinese Side 
November OFTA announced the details o f P C S 
199 4 licensing and invited bidding. ‘. ^__ . 
March OFTA received 14 proposals for six PCS 
1995 licenses. Licenses were intended to be 
granted in August. 
July The nc vs about the finaI list was leaked Cheh said they had never discussed the 
1995 outis. issue with the British J L G members. 
‘Licensescould not be granted unless 
both sides had reached a consensus.''^ 
August Economic Services Branch announced the 'Sources said no timetable had been set 
1995 ‘licenses were unlikely to be ready.，】， for the matter to be d i scussed."' 
September OFTA demanded the approval o f J L G as Chen said ' they had to reach a consensus 
1995 soon as possible' ' . on the conditions of granting the licenses 
| a n d t h e n u m b e r oflicenses.*^" 
12 Hong Kong Standard, June 11，1994. 
13 Ta:Kung Pao, 19 November, 1994. 
“Sou th China Moming Post, 28 July 1995. 
'^ Eastern Express, 27 December 1995. 
16 South China Moming Post, 28 July 1995. 
1' Hong Kong Standard, 18 August 1995. 
IS Hong Kong Standard, 18 August 1995. 
19 Sing Tao Jih Pao, 29 September 1995. 
2° Ta Kung Pao, 5 September 1995. 
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一 Date The British Side The Chinese Side 
January *Chinese officials privately questioned 
1996 the wisdom of giving out so many licenses 
i na small place.*^^ 
February Hong Kong Government and OFTA Objected to the issue of six Iicenses at one 
1996 insisted the issue ofsix licenses". tirn^ but there was no concksion 
reached on the appropriate number of 
licenses^. 
After careful consultation in 1995, it was *Questioned whether the new entrants 
believed that the market would support have to cIose their businesses after 1 or 2 
the six licenses". years under intense competition, which 
would greatly affect economics.’ 
'Moreover, it was just around the days 
. . . o f the formation o f H o n g K o n g SAR. ' " 
The JLG British leader, Hugh Davies, Government agency criticized the British 
said they had submitted the details to the for ]eaking information and creating 
Chinese side in July 1995. The Chinese public pressure on the Chinese side". 
side did not give any response but 
required more information in late 1995. 
Davies expressed he was very : dissatisfied26 ； 
Davies said ‘the British were always Ghina's senior representative, Zhao 
v；; prepared to give information, but did not Jihua, complained theBritish side had 
know what Beijing wanted. The hot supplied sufficient information and 
Chinese officials seemed to be worried the Chinesesidealso needed to conduct 
about the number of licenses, but had their own research". 
never explained why.’" . 
JLG agreed to set up a working group to determine the number of licenses. A 
special panel would meet for the first time later this month. 
March After the British team's presentation to Chen claimed ' the British G o v e r n m e n t ~ 
1996 the Chinese, ‘the Chinese counterparts was changing the market structure and 
had not uttered a word.'^° pdlicy on the PCS issue.'^' ‘They 
needed to spend more time studying the 
problem. ' " 
• . • -.+.• . • • : ‘ : . ‘ - • . • • • -
• : . : : . • . ' ••."；：；-：•；：•；••• ••：. V ；•： .：：；. ： • •； . • • . •• ： . -- .- . . : . - : : • 
The British leader said the information The figures supplied by Britain were 
was 'self-explanatory', 'convincing' and 'unconvincing, lacking scientiOc basis 
K e r y d e t a i l e d ' " . | a n d a c c u r a c y ? 
21 South China Moming Post, 15 January 1996. 
22 Ming Pao, 8 February 1996. 
23 Ming Pao, 8 February 1996. 
24 Ming Pao, 8 February 1996. 
“ M i n g Pao, 8 February 1996. 
26 Hong Kong Economic Journal, 10 February 1996. 
“ H o n g Kong Economic Joumal, 10 February 1996. 
28 South China Moming Post, 29 February 1996. 
29 Eastem Express, 11 February 1996. 
3° Hong Kong Standard, 1 March 1996. 
^' South China Moming Post, 1 March 1996. 
32 South China Morning Post, 2 March 1996. 
“ H o n g Kong Standard, 2 March 1996. 
34 Hong Kong Standard, 2 March 1996. 
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Date The British Side The Chinese Side 
April ChiefSecretary, Anson Chan, met 
1996 Chinese officials at Beijing and 
demanded a speedy approval o fPCS 
licenses" 
June ~~~ A government official said ‘it would be A Chinese official said he ‘expected no 
1996 no more than a standing item on the JLG breakthrough on the Ucensing issue.*" 
agenda.'" 
July JLG announced an initial agreement on the issuing of six PCS licenses. Formal 
1996 agreement would be signed by JLG leaders, Hugh Davies and Zhao Jihua after the 
summer. 
September Six new licenses were granted to operators. 
1996 
The conflicts and disputes between the British and the Chinese sides were 
mainly due to misunderstanding and lack of communication. OFTA knew that the 
PCS issue was something that straddled 1997, but the Government had not prepared 
thoroughly for the JLG approval. The leakage of information was an unfortunate 
thing which had angered the Chinese side for lacking consultation and consensus. It 
was very surprising to the public that when the news about the final list of successful 
bidders was released by the press, the Chinese officials said that they had never 
discussed the issue. This exposed the unstable situation of the Sino-British relation. 
It was this fluctuating political condition which delayed the licensing of the non-
political business activities. Furthermore, it was believed that many bidders tried to 
lobby the Chinese officials and the unsuccessful bidders also stirred up the case into a 
more complicated issue^^. The forces of political conflicts and corporate strategic 
lobbying give way for the interplay of politics and economics comes to the front of 
the stage. 
35 Hong Kong Economic Joumal, 25 June 1996. 
36 Eastern Express, 2 June 1996. 
“ E a s t e m Express, 2 June 1996. 
38 Interview with Alexander Arena, former Director-General of OFTA, on 14 April 1997. 
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When the JLG agreed to set up a working group to examine the issue, the time 
had been delayed for six months. However, the working group did not help the 
situation but gave way to another series of attacks between the two sides. After six 
months, better news was released to the public, making the situation clearer than 
before. The whole issue had totally been delayed for more than a year, the most 
unfortunate party was the new licensees. It is not the task of this chapter to find out 
the true reason for the delay but it is understood that the cooperation between the two 
sides is insufficient and inefficient. Rather, a more important implication or 
influence on the cellular communication market is that the more the delay of the 
granting of licenses, the more the opportunities for the existing operators to raise 
intense competition in order to get a larger and firmer market share before new 
entrants enter the market. The existing operators in fact had exerted their market 
power over the market in late 1996 by carrying out various new marketing and 
corporate strategies to counteract the coming of PCS. With the existing market 
power possessed by the existing operators, they are indeed in a much more 
advantageous position than those who are not ready to enter the market, meaning the 
positions of the new entrants are more passive than those of the existing operators. 
The Bidding Consortiums 
There were all together 14 interested parties who submitted PCS proposals in 
March 1995. Because of the huge investment (a total of 60 billion Hong Kong 
dollars) in establishing the new PCS networks, only those parties who had very 
strong financial backup would be advantageous. The more the economic power, the 
more the political power in bargaining with the licensing authority. The greatest 
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attraction of the PCS licenses was that there would certainly be great profits after 
long-term investment and operation. Although the opportunity cost was very high, 
many corporations were willing to take the risks. It also showed that cellular 
communication had its potential and importance for the society. Among the bidders, 
many of them were property companies with the support of prestigious international 
telecommunications companies or suppliers. In addition, among the fourteen 
bidders, six of them had Chinese background. There were also overseas investors 
from Denmark, Norway, Italy, Finland, Britain and the United States. With a 
competitive environment in the cellular communication market, the PCS licenses 
really attracted investments from pretty high-quality companies. Many analysts 
predicted that bidders who had relations with Chinese companies or institutes would 
have greater opportunity in getting the licenses. This prediction was due to the 
intimate China-Hong Kong relation in economics and politics accompanied by the 
1997 issue. The background and details of the 14 bidders are listed as follows: 
Companies Shareholding Structure % of Origin of 
Shares Shareholder 
T~~Hongkong Telecom CSL ^ ~ ~ H o n g Kong 
CSL Guangdong Posts and Telecom 33% China 
2. Smartone Sun Hung Kai Properties 40% Hong Kong 
US-based McCaw 30% US 
ABC Communications (Holdings) 15% Hong Kong 
Town Kahn (under China's Ministry 15% China 
ofPosts and Telecommunications) 
3. Pacific Link First Pacific 65% Hong Kong 
Vodafone 35% UK 
4. Hutchison Hutchison Telecommunications 70% Hong Kong 
Telephone Motorola 30% US 
5. The Peoples China Resources 54.5% China 
Telephone Co. Telepaging 18% Hong Kong/China 
Unisource 22% China 
MSI (Cellular Systems Memational) 5.5% Europe 
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6. Wharf Wharf - Hong Kong 
Communicat ions Singapore Telecom 一 Singapore 
Investment Qualcomm - U S 
7. Chevalier Telepoint Chevalier Group 5 1 % H o n g Kong 
Telstra 4 9 % -
8. P P l u s Star Paging 2 7 % H o n g Kong 
Communicat ions Pacific Electric Wire and Cable 2 5 % Taiwan 
Limited Asia Paging 7% H o n g Kong 
Telecom Paging 10% H o n g Kong 
BB Telecom 4 % Hong Kong 
Epro Paging Services 一 一 
Telecom Finland 2 3 % Finland 
PTT o f S h a n g h a i 3 % China 
9. N e w World New Wor ld Telephone 6 8 % Hong Kong 
Telephone Ying Fook Telecommunicat ions 17% -
Thailand (Asia) Telecommunicat ions 15% Thailand 
VS Wes t 二 -
10. Mandar in L a i S u n D e v e l o p m e n t 3 0 % Hong Kong 
Communicat ions USI Holdings 3 0 % Hong Kong 
China Travel Services 10% China 
Hong K o n g Parkview 10% China 
Distacom Hong K o n g 2 0 % Hong Kong 
11. Universal Personal Sun H u n g Kai Industries - Hong Kong 
Communicat ions New Wor ld Development - Hong Kong 
( U P C ) Citic A B C - -
12. Honeycomb TeleDanmark - Denmark 
Hysan Development 3 0 % Hong Kong 
Unicom (also known as Liantong) 一 China 
Telenor AS. - Norway 
13. Champion Champion Technology 80% Hong Kong 
Telephone (A network system company) 2 0 % -
14. (A consortium - -
Unknown) 
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The 1997 issue did not give great preference and priority to all those companies 
with Chinese counterparts. The six successful bidders were: 
1. Pacific Link 
2. Hutchison Telephone 
3. The Peoples Telephone Co. 
4. P Plus Communications Limited 
5. New World Telephone 
6. Mandarin Communications 
The Peoples Telephone Co. and Mandarin Communications were fairly new 
operators in the telecommunications market with no participation history. However, 
they had the strongest fmancial support from the Chinese investors compared with 
the other four operators. It was suspected that their strong relation v/ith Chinese 
investors brought them the advantage of winning the bid. The other four operators 
had been actively participating in the Hong Kong telecommunications market. They 
could be regarded as the existing powers compared with the two new participants. 
Pacific Link and Hutchison Telephone were in very advantageous positions as the 
public had accepted their operations in cellular services. They could borrow the 
existing marketing tools to promote their PCS services. P Plus Communication 
would also enjoy benefits to a great extent as five of its shareholders were running 
paging services which had a total of 300,000 paging customers and offered a total of 
280 paging transmission sites. The transmission sites facilitated a wide coverage of 
services and the company could just invest more to upgrade the existing facilities. 
Besides, the paging market had been threatened by the growth of the cellular 
communication market in recent years and it was a strategy for the paging operators 
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to form a consortium in driving their own services further to another market. With 
the stable customer base, it seemed quite likely that combinations of paging and PCS 
services accompanied by more value-added services would be marketed together as a 
single package. The P Plus Communication consortium was a real type of strategic 
alliance in order to help the paging services survive. Regarding New World 
Telephone, it started its business in local fixed telephone networks in 1995 as an 
attack to the traditional telephony monopoly business. It was another new try for 
the company to expand its business in the cellular communication market in a new 
area. 
The final list showed that those who had either very strong financial backup or 
with active participation history in the field were likely to be the winners. OFTA 
had not released anything for explaining its selection. The selection process was 
being criticized as non-transparent. An important remark was that Hongkong 
Telecom CSL, the territory,s largest telecommunications operator and controlled by 
Britain's Cable & Wirdess，failed to get on the winners' list. The failure of CSL in 
the bidding was regarded as politically significant as it was a British-based subsidiary 
and it was suspected that the company did not win the favor of the Chinese side. 
However, I would argue that OFTA considered the proposals from a consumer-
oriented perspective as most sources commented that CSL's business plan did not 
offer a favorable service price to the consumers. 
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The Forces at Work 
hi the case of PCS, it is apparent that all the forces concerning politics, 
economics and technology are at work. The greatest power influencing the PCS issue 
is the political condition. The unstable political condition affects the smooth and 
speedy development of the new services to the largest extent. Although the 
regulator takes the initiative to exert its influence in pushing the market development, 
the unfavorable Sino-British relation discourages the regulator's will. At the same 
time, corporate alliances and strategies are posing pressure on the further 
development of the competitive market. Technology is once again an important 
driving force in bringing about new changes and advancement. • 
The Irony of a Free Market Place 
We see that the further liberalization of the cellular communication market is a 
very intentional decision of OFTA. OFTA was being seriously questioned by the 
public about the necessity of setting the number of licenses at six. Many critics 
queried whether it would be beneficial to the public to allow a total of eight cellular 
operators (the six PCS operators the two existing digital operators) to run businesses 
in a small place like Hong Kong. According to the official explanation, OFTA's 
planning is to set a maximum number of licenses dictated by technology and the 
availability of spectrum but not a minimum number. OFTA's job is let the market 
decide whether it is possible to fill up the maximum number of licenses or not^ .^ 
However, one predictable problem is that when the maximum number of interested 
parties enter the market, they will face huge difficulties in expanding the market 
39 Interview with Alexander Arena, former Director-General ofOFTA, on 14 April 1997. 
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share under the unprecedented competitive environment. Profit margins of all the 
operators will surely be lowered. There is an unavoidable threat that some of the 
operators have to close their businesses after few years of operation. If the case 
really happens, the number of operators will be suddenly reduced and only a few will 
still be able to survive. Ironically, a free market place will be turned to the situation 
of oligopoly again. 
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Chapter 4 
Cellular Communication Market and 1997 
The 1997 question of Hong Kong's handover to China adds complexity to the 
political economy of the cellular communication market. The rationale lies in the 
contrasting regulatory environments in telecommunications of the two places. 
Although the principle of 'One Country, Two Systems' guarantees literally that Hong 
Kong has relative autonomy of being a Special Administrative Region (SAR), the 
different atmosphere of Hong Kong and China motivates a certain degree of 
speculation towards the issue. Focusing on the cellular communication market, 
however, the 1997 issue does not seem to pose any threats or changes. Instead, the 
issue seems to stimulate market development. 
Cellular Telephony in China's Telecommunications Market 
Ln China, telecommunications is still largely a State-provided service. ‘The 
Ministry ofPosts and Telecommunications (MPT) is both the regulator and operator, 
and the only commercial operator.，！ The MPT is a traditional monopoly which 
combines three functions under its umbrella: (1) policy and regulation, (2) service 
provision and (3) equipment manufacturingl The cellular telephony sector is 
significantly more liberal than the other telecommunications sectors. This is very 
similar to Hong Kong. 'The MPT's original projection for cellular telephones was 
30，000 subscribers by 1995. Ln 1994 there were an estimated 200,000 users, and 
I Lovelock, Peter. 'China's Telecommunications Policy and Hong Kong, 1997: Bargaining Positions' 
, Telecommunications Policy, Vol.20 No.9. 1996. P.686. 
^an，Zixiang. ‘Challenge to the MPT's monopoly.. Telecommunications Policy. Vol. 18 No.3, 
1994• P • 175 • 
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half of them were in Guangdong province. If the expansion forecasts of the coastal 
provinces are a guide, the likely capacity of cellular networks in China by the year 
2000 could well reach the 6 million mark. Certainly every town and city of any size 
is either building a cellular network or is planning one.，〕][n particular, ‘Guangdong 
Province has been openly proclaiming its intention of becoming a centre linking 
central, westem and south-eastern China with Hong Kong, Macau and Asia-Pacific 
region after 1997/ 
The regulator in China also encourages the development of cellular 
communication in various special business regions like Guangdong province, Beijing, 
Shanghai and so on. These business districts require intact communication 
networks to facilitate business operations which is very similar to Hong Kong. 
'The progress of liberalization seems to require certain political preconditions.'^ 
The changing regulatory framework is a political precondition in liberalizing the 
cellular communication market. An undeniable fact is that ‘China welcomes 
economic liberalization but fears political liberalization.'^ Under the communist 
regime, China exerts intense control over telecommunications. In China, 
telecommunications are part ofthe national security networks. ‘They are part ofthe 
drive towards national economic modernization and they are also part of Beijing's 
central need to keep in touch with, and control over, the outlying provinces.'^ The 
s Ure, John. Telecommunications, with Chinese Characteristics.' Telecommunications Policy, Vol. 
18No.3. 1994. P.187. 
4 Lee, Paul S.N.. ‘Hong Kong as a Communications Hub: Is deregulation enough?' i 
Telecommunications Policy, September/October 1993. P. 479. 
5 Tan, Zixiang. ‘Challenge to the MPT's monopoly.' Telecommunications Policy, Vol. 18 No.3, 
1994. P.181. 
6 Mueller, Milton. 'Contested Terrain: Hong Kong's International Telecommunications on the Eve 
of 1997' in Edward A. Comor (ed.), The Global Political Economy ofCommunication: 
Hegemony, Telecommunication and the Information Economy O^Jew York: St. Martin's Press, 
1994) p. l37. 
7 Ure, John. 'Telecommunications in China and Four Dragons.，Telecommunications in Asia: Policy, 
Planning and Development. Hong Kong: HongKongUniversityPress, 1995. P.15. 
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Chinese government believes political chaos would arise if there is no appropriate 
control of telecommunications. However, China is promoting economic 
liberalization in selective areas. The belief of controlling telecommunications is 
changing which is seen in the opening up the CPE market to foreign manufacturers. 
The flourishing economy of cellular services and customer equipment in the Special 
Economic Regions (SERs) located in the coastal regions of Guangdong Province 
proves the MPT is changing the regulatory framework. A great degree of relaxation 
in industrial policy is upholding the economy of various selective special regions. 
Hong Kong Post-1997 
With the free market philosophy posed by the Hong Kong Government, it is 
speculated that the two systems of Hong Kong and China will not integrate very 
easily. The case in the cellular communication market may be somehow different. 
There are important similarities between the telecommunication sector and the other 
areas of the Chinese economy which have been opened to economic reforms. In 
both cases Hong Kong has fulfilled an important intermediary role in international 
trade. ‘Hong Kong serves as an entrepot or re-export center in commodity trade, 
and as an intermediary for financial services between China and the rest of the 
5 8 
world.，Hong Kong, as a very important gateway to China, attracts a large number of 
consortiums and overseas investors to make huge investment in telecommunications 
networks. Interested parties are all looking for a share in telecommunications in the 
huge China market. This can be seen in the shareholding structure of the 
consortiums bidding for the PCS services. Overseas investors are very willing to 
8 Mueller, Milton. 'One Country, Two Systems: What will 1997 Mean in Telecommunications?’ 
Telecommunications Policy, Vol. 18 No.3, 1994. P.248. 
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cooperate with the local and mainland investors. The benefits to China is the 
provision of technical expertise and huge financial investment through Hong Kong. 
Hong Kong will in fact provide an international gateway for China to accept foreign 
investment and foreign expertise in order to upgrade the network facilities. 
hi China, the number of cellular users was 1,560,000 in 1994. It is estimated 
that there will be as many as 8,000,000 users at the end of 1997^. ‘The President of 
China's Academy of Telecommunications Technology (a part of the Ministry ofPost 
and Telecommunications), Professor Xiong Bingqun, said the use of foreign capital 
and technology remained essential for the continued rapid development of the 
country's (China's) infrastructure.'^® The assistance of foreign investment in capital 
and expertise is widely being regarded as basic necessity in China's 
telecommunications development. Many overseas conglomerates have openly 
addressed their interests in looking for investment opportunities in China, such as the 
US-based AT&T and MCI, the UK-based British Telecom, etc. 
In 1994，China opened its first access road to the information super-highway 
with the inauguration of an ultra-high-speed digital transmission system between 
Hong Kong and Guangdong Province. The technology was provided by AT&T. 
Operation was done by the Guangdong Posts and Telecommunications Bureau and 
Hongkong Telecom International. Besides, other projects led by AT&T, Motorola 
and Siemens had been set up in China through the formation of various joint-
ventures. Starting from 1987，Hongkong Telecom had expanded local cellular 
communication to China. Hongkong users now can use their phones in more than 
40 cities in China. In 1996，Hongkong Telecom talked with the MPT about setting 
9 Sing Tao Jih Pao, 26 November 1995. 
'° South China Moming Post, 23 August 1994. 
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up a China-wide global system for a cellular telecommunications network but there 
was no further announcement of progress. Other operators were also looking for 
room of investment, trying to prepare a path for entering the Chinese market in post-
1997. 
The Way Forward 
It is doubtful that Hongkong-owned companies would be exempt from a ban on 
foreign ownership in entering the China market after 1997. Beijing had updated 
• many of its laws banning foreign investment in 1995. ‘The ban extended to foreign 
joint ventures and to provincial telecommunications authorities' absorption of 
foreign capital.'^^ The move shows that Beijing still considers telecommunications 
as a tool for national security and stability. The Chinese government is still very 
sensitive about foreign control of its telecommunications. However, it is a global 
trend that the consideration of national security is diminishing in importance as 
economic demand exerts greater influence over the market. 
The cellular communication market of Hong Kong, on the one hand, seems to 
have a self-determining position as the market is well-developed, open to 
competition and open to all kinds of investment. It is unlikely that the Chinese 
government will intervene Hong Kong's cellular communication market under the 
'One Country, Two Systems' principle. On the other hand, it seems very difficult 
for the Hong Kong players to enter the China market immediately in the coming 
years. 
“ H o n g Kong Standard, 8 July 1996. 
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Conclusion 
This study analyses the historical development and changes of cellular 
communication in Hong Kong between the mid-1980's and the late 1990's. It also 
attempts to identify the forces driving the deregulation and liberalization processes of 
cellular communication within a political economy framework. The underlying 
framework is characterized by three factors, namely the political factors (including 
the regulatory environment and political condition), the economic factors (including 
the capital ownership and corporate strategy) and the technological factor. The 
careful examination of the cellular communication market also brings about the 
discovery of some extraneous factors that are uniquely present at a particular 
situation and a particular period of time. 
The cellular communication sector can be regarded as a forerunner or initiator of 
deregulation and liberalization in telecommunications starting from the mid-1980's. 
The Government opened the cellular communication market for competition and 
expansion in 1987. The market became one of the first major telecommunications 
sectors that faced pressures and challenges from different political, economic and 
technological forces. The most apparent force is the advancement of technology 
which helps to challenge the concept of monopolizing telecommunications as 
technology makes the scope of products and services wider, giving more 
opportunities for new players to enter the market. Overseas pressure, especially 
from the United States, is also significant. Successful models of 
telecommunications liberalization in Britain, United States and Japan in the 1980's 
showed the benefits of competition in telecommunications markets. As a colonial 
ruling party, the Hong Kong Government followed Britain's example by only 
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opening cellular services, paging services and the customer premises equipment 
markets to competition. 
In general, the driving forces in the beginning stage of the liberalization process 
involves the interplay of technology, a changing regulatory perspective and the 
political pressure from overseas regulatory models. The factors are either 
technological or political in nature and they exert much more powerful influences. 
The effects ofcapital ownership and corporate strategy are not apparent until 1992. 
In 1992，digitalization technology was well-developed which enabled the 
cellular companies to offer better quality and cheaper products and services. The 
regulator, OFTA, encouraged the use of such technology and allocated the required 
spectrum to the operators to run their businesses. OFTA's pro-competitive and pro-
consumer perspectives made room for intense competition. As the network capacity 
was greatly upgraded and enlarged because of digitalization, the four cellular 
operators initiated a large scale and long-term price war accompanied by costly 
marketing strategies so as to compete for larger market share. With very strong 
financial backup from local as well as overseas shareholders, the few operators 
were able to use their market powers to the greatest extent in running Uieir businesses. 
From that period onwards, the cellular communication market seemed to be run by an 
oligopoly. 
The political economy framework is best described by oligopoly in the digital 
era. A dynamic market is created under the pro-competitive regulatory environment, 
political stability, the effect of strong capital ownership and corporate strategies as 
well as digitalization technology. All of the forces are competing and affecting the 
market. They are also interdependent upon one another as the dynamics of the 
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market cannot be established without any one of the factors. 
The introduction of PCS is another highlight within the political economy 
framework. Like digitalization, PCS represents the advancement of technology for 
a new age. It facilitates the offer of flexible packages of products and services for 
consumers. The regulator's position is encouraging. The regulatory framework is 
approaching a free market philosophy with six new licenses issued at one time, 
bringing about a total of eight operators to run the cellular communication market 
from 1997 onwards. The forces of capital interests and corporate strategy are also at 
work. The most significant part of the PCS issue is the influence of the conflicting 
views between the British and Chinese officials of the Joint Liaison Group in the 
approval process. In the first place, the delay of the approval of licenses gave way 
to political lobbying by the license bidders. Second, the delay gave a chance for the 
existing cellular operators to gain advantage over new entrants by raising a renewed 
competitive price war in order to secure a firm market share before the entrance of 
new players. Third, consumer benefits were exploited as the time for adopting new 
technology and pursuing wider range of products and services was delayed. 
The PCS issue indicates the power of how political conditions determine the 
development of the market. Political instability is mingled with market economics. 
It is political condition which exerts the strongest power in the case of PCS. The 
case suggests the question that liberalization of telecommunications seems to require 
certain political stability before actual actions take place. 
In approaching the days of Hong Kong's handover to China, the 1997 question 
makes the issue more complicated. It brings benefits to the cellular communication 
market in the way that the market attracts foreign and local investments, which is 
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proved in the PCS bidding game. Hong Kong, as an important gateway to China, 
gives the cellular communication investors the hope of entering the China market. 
However, because of the conflicting views of Hong Kong and China towards 
telecommunications policy, the integration of Hong Kong and China in running 
cellular business seems to be quite unlikely. It is more appropriate to say that on the 
one haiid, the Communist Party will still exert control on telecommunications in the 
mainland through political and legal means by banning foreign investment. On the 
other hand, the Party allows mainland investment in Hong Kong to gain profits in a 
new market for Chinese investors. 
Within the political economy framework, the examination of different forces 
proves the presence of a power sharing relationship. Although the forces are 
interdependent, they are not always working on an equal footing. They are working 
along a competing reality. The historical development of cellular communication 
brings about a comparison. During the earliest stage of liberalization, technology 
and politics exert the greatest influence. Under the oligopoly situation, politics and 
economics seem to have the greatest influence. The PCS case shows the greatest 
influence merely comes from political instability. 
In retrospect, the Government had not done enough in the planning of how the 
telecommunications market should be developed or regulated. This was apparently 
shown in the delay of setting up the independent regulatory body, OFTA, until 1993. 
The decision came too late as the deregulation and liberalization in the cellular, 
paging and CPE markets had taken place around the mid-1980's. Focusing on the 
cellular communication market, the regulator adopts a phased licensing framework. 
Phased licenses, in a certain way, can be more successful than simultaneously 
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awarded licenses. This approach is a design of issuing a certain number of licenses 
designed for several phases of development. One of the benefits to operators is it 
allows more time for them to think and plan for future business development. This 
approach to licensing also creates new entrants in established m a r k e t s � O n the 
contrary，although this approach enables the regulator to improve planning certainty 
and facilitates supervision over the existing operators, it does not benefit new 
entrants in the way that new players have less market power than the existing players. 
That means even though all interested parties have the same chance to enter the 
market, the starting positions of existing and new parties are really different. The 
different timing of licensing influence the investment and opportunities for boA new 
and established operators. As a whole, this approach to licensing shows how 
political decisions affect economic decision. 
Economic decisions, on the other hand, somehow affect political decisions. 
Corporate strategy and capital ownership greatly determine the existence of an 
operator. Only those who are economically powerful and possess adequate 
resources are eligible for applying a cellular license. The reality comes with the 
concentration of market power in the hands of the largest companies. Thus, in any 
bidding game of licenses, smaller firms lacking giant shareholders' backup are the 
disadvantaged. The political decision by the regulator of who gets a license is 
greatly affected by economic considerations. It is undeniable that there are some 
barriers to entry. It does not totally fit with the idea of a free market place nor with 
the central concepts of economic liberalism in a technology-driven market. 
Though the operation of the cellular communication market seems to be 
‘Glynn, Simon. 'How Many Cellular Licenses Should There Be?’ Telecommunications Policy, 
Vol. 18,No.2, 1994. P.94. 
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imperfect, the intense competition brought up by the operators really seems to satisfy 
consumer demands. Competition among the market players speeds up the 
liberalization process and it is indeed a form of deregulation. The operation of the 
cellular communication market proves to be a success indicated by the unprecedented 
rapid expansion of market size. 
The success of a liberalized cellular communication market acts as a model for 
the liberalization of local fixed network in Hong Kong, which is a move totally 
breaking with the traditional monopoly telephony. The Government is made more 
confident that liberalization is a right move for other telecommunications sector. 
This leads to the setting up o fa second network in 1995, marking a significant step in 
the opening up of the local telephone network. International telephony will also be 
liberalized in 2006 after the franchise granted to Hongkong Telecom Litemational 
expires. 
As no researcher talks about the changes in the cellular communication industry 
in detail, this study helps to complement more facts and knowledge in 
telecommunications studies. In addition, most telecommunications studies in Hong 
Kong were taken between 1991 and 1994. This study takes one step further in 
covering the history of a communication technology from the mid-1980's to the most 
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